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Petroski: The Rhetoric of Symmetry

THE RHETORIC OF SYMMETRY
Karen Petroski∗
I. INTRODUCTION
References to the concept of symmetry have appeared in judicial
opinions, advocacy efforts, and scholarly commentary throughout
American legal history. But for every legal writer who invokes the
concept as a logical or moral ideal, there is another who dismisses it as a
formalistic distraction or an arid illusion. What is more, although legal
writers virtually always use the term “symmetry” as if its meaning were
self-evident, in fact they have used the same term to refer to a variety of
distinct concepts, each with its own ambiguities.
These inconsistencies, and the deeper patterns beneath them, should
be of interest to all legal professionals, not only to scholars. Normative
references to symmetry are more than trivial examples of the rhetorical
practices that give our legal discourse its characteristic texture. Like all
of these rhetorical practices, references to symmetry both structure and
constrain legal reasoning in significant ways.1 In fact, legal rhetoric and
legal reasoning—the themes and structures of persuasion typical of legal
writing—are simply two sides of the same coin, interdependent and
mutually supporting aspects of any functional, effective legal
communication.2 Partly as a result of this relationship between legal
rhetoric and reasoning, the examination of our rhetorical practices can
indicate the limits of our thinking.3 Sustained analysis of even a
seemingly insignificant rhetorical device may serve this end, as this
Article seeks to demonstrate. The historical analysis presented here
suggests that despite the inconsistencies noted above, references to
symmetry have played a consistent role in legal writing. But, in part
∗

J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 2004; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1999.
See NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW 31, 54, 254 (2005); J.M.
Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in
LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211-24 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz
eds., 1996). But see discussion infra note 215.
2
See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
THE LAW 17 (1985) (noting that in classical rhetoric, persuasion involved stating grounds
for a conclusion); see also ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW
165-93 (2000); MACCORMICK, supra note 1; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2008 (2002); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary
Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 216, 219 (1990); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results
and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995); Gerald Wetlaufer,
Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545 passim (1990).
3
See Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)
(“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they end often by enslaving it.”).
1
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because the nature of this role has never been expressly acknowledged,
references to symmetry in legal writing may also function to reinforce
broader patterns in legal rhetoric and thinking about law. These remain
powerful as long as they remain unexamined. Closer attention to the
role the concept has played can help us see ways to counteract the
threats these patterns might pose to the effectiveness of our
communication in and about legal institutions.
Recent criticism of a parallel theme in contemporary political and
military-strategic rhetoric illustrates the potential ramifications of
uncritical allusions to “symmetry.” Since the late 1990s,4 United States
military strategists have increasingly applied the label “asymmetric” to a
growing range of nonconventional military challenges.5 Many such
references to “asymmetric threats” or “asymmetric warfare” have little in
common other than application of the adjective to scenarios involving
antagonists of the United States.6 Commentators critical of this rhetoric
have pointed out that asymmetry is always a matter of perspective, that
it is nothing new in warfare, and that the United States itself poses a kind
of “asymmetric threat” to other global actors.7 These critics contend that
labeling new scenarios “asymmetric” is a way of avoiding analysis by
identifying a relationship as self-evidently unfair.8 More importantly,
these uses of the label distance United States military strategy from
responsibility for security shortfalls by attributing those shortfalls to the
inherent unfairness of opponents’ tactics, rather than to any failure by
Kenneth E. McKenzie, Jr., What Is Asymmetric Warfare?, in THE REVENGE OF THE
MELIANS: ASYMMETRIC THREATS AND THE NEXT QDR 1 (2000), available at
http://www.hdu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair62/m62cvr.html (dating the first appearance
of the term to a 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review report); see also Robert David Steele, The
Asymmetric Threat: Listening to the Debate, JOINT FORCES Q., Aut.-Wint. 1998-99, at 78-84,
available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfg_pubs/1520.pdf.
5
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. BLANK, RETHINKING ASYMMETRIC THREATS 7 (Sept. 2003), available
at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/asymetry2.pdf; STEVEN LAMBAKIS ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING “ASYMMETRIC” THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 59-62 (Sept. 2002),
available at http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Asymmetry%20%20final%2002.pdf; Timothy J.
Thomas, Deciphering Asymmetry’s Word Game, MIL. REV. 32, July-Aug. 2001, at 1-2, available
at http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/English/JulAug01/thomas.htm. By the
mid-2000s the term had entered popular discourse. See, e.g., David Carr, I’m in Love. Why
Shouldn’t I Be Paid?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at C1 (describing race for celebrity photos
among paparazzi and tabloid newspapers as “asymmetric warfare”).
6
See BLANK, supra note 5, at 3-6; Thomas, supra note 5, at 1-2.
7
See, e.g., BLANK, supra note 5, passim; McKenzie, supra note 4, at 4-13; Thomas, supra
note 5, at 2, 6.
8
See generally BLANK, supra note 5, passim; Thomas, supra note 5, at 3-4; see also, BLANK,
supra note 5, at 16 (“[A]symmetric threats or techniques are a version of not ‘fighting
fair[ ]’. . . .” (quoting INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUD., NAT’L DEF. UNIV., STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
1998, at 169)).
4
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the United States to investigate the strategic goals of various nonstate
actors.9 In effect, the critics describe references to “asymmetric threats”
as themselves subtle threats to national security.
These critics have anticipated many of the observations that emerge
from this Article. They note the extent to which perceptions and
assertions of symmetry depend on the speaker’s or writer’s frame of
reference, the ways this dependency can result in the assignment of
opposed normative values to the concept, the apparent readiness with
which writers and speakers use it to avoid confronting or analyzing
complex scenarios, and our tendency to overlook all of these
implications. This Article shows how these dynamics are also present in
legal use of the concept and the term, and how careless references to
“symmetry” in that context may also pose a threat of sorts. However,
this Article also draws from the story of legal reliance on the conceptpositive lessons for more careful approaches to the problems that we
have used the term and concept of “symmetry” to avoid rather than to
resolve.
Part II of this Article introduces the term and the concept. It first
discusses current usage of the term “symmetry” outside the legal context
and the three senses in which the term has been used in legal
discourse—to refer to holistic aesthetic harmony, to relationships of
precise correspondence, and to relationships of bilateral reflection. Part
II then explores the power and implications of these senses of the term
by discussing the relations between these abstract conceptions and our
perceptions and everyday life experiences. By emphasizing the links
between concrete experience and the abstractions to which the term
refers, this discussion shows how the significance of the concept of
symmetry is neither self-evident nor trivially simple. Part III then
presents a brief survey of the ways legal scholars to date have
nevertheless tended to assume that the meaning of the concept is selfevident. Their possibly increasing reliance on the concept further
clarifies the need for a better understanding of its function in legal
rhetoric.
Part IV surveys the ways in which the concept has been used in legal
rhetoric, primarily judicial opinions, throughout United States legal
history. It identifies five areas of judicial functioning to which this
rhetoric has linked the concept of symmetry: rendering justice or
See BLANK, supra note 5, at 32 (“[W]hat makes this ‘asymmetric strategy’ a compelling
threat is that it surpasses our capabilities of cognition . . . .”); see also id. passim.

9
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achieving fairness, remaining faithful to the purposes of other
lawmakers, making coherent law, correcting for market imperfections,
and providing reasoned support for conclusions. In each area, legal
writers have consistently appealed to symmetry as a norm, but they have
also questioned the validity of that norm. Regardless of whether
symmetry is viewed positively or critically, however, most references to
the concept serve a similar rhetorical function: underscoring the relative
powerlessness or passivity of the writing court. Writers of judicial
opinions consistently use the term to describe the work courts do and to
deny the labor and contingency that go into that work, or to assign this
labor and risk to other institutions.
Part V begins by reviewing the patterns described in Part IV in
historical perspective to clarify the larger patterns in the use of the term.
Specifically, Part V explains how the story told in Part IV is one of
increasing conceptual pluralism and of increasing reliance on each of the
conceptions of symmetry to articulate a posture of judicial passivity.
Part V then briefly reviews the problems inherent in current uses of the
term, summarizes the lessons that emerge from this review, and offers
some preliminary suggestions for more self-aware use of the concept of
symmetry in legal thought and writing.
II. SENSES OF SYMMETRY
A. Current Usage
According to standard modern dictionaries, English speakers
currently use the term “symmetry” in four related ways.
The
relationships among these senses of the term are, at least superficially,
relatively straightforward: (1) “symmetry” refers to the quality of
having “balanced proportions,” or “beauty of form deriving from
balanced proportions”; (2) it also refers to “the property of being
symmetrical; [especially] correspondence in size, shape, and relative
position of parts on both sides of a dividing line”; (3) in a more technical
geometric sense, it refers to the property of “a rigid motion of a
geometric figure that determines a one-to-one mapping onto itself”; and
(4) finally, in a sense used primarily in physics, it refers to “the property
of remaining invariant under certain changes (as of orientation in
space . . . or of the direction of time flow).”10 The following discussion
outlines the history of and some of the relationships among these senses
of the term.
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1266 (11th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S].

10
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Holistic Symmetry

The first dictionary sense of “symmetry”—”beauty of form deriving
from balanced proportions”—is close to the original Hellenistic Greek
meaning of the term.11 For many centuries afterward this was its
primary meaning. It is also the earliest sense in which the term appears
in legal usage in the United States.12 At least after its initial appearance,
this sense has largely lacked the connotations of correspondence tied to
the other three senses in current use. 13 That is, instead of naming a
relationship among different entities, this sense of the term names a
unified relationship between parts and whole or a human response
arising from perception of such a relationship. Still, this sense of
symmetry overlaps with the other senses discussed below. Most
obviously, instances of geometric symmetry, discussed next, appear to
most people to involve pleasingly “balanced proportions,”14 as discussed
in Part II.B.2 below.
2.

Symmetry as Correspondence and Reflection

The second and third senses of the term noted above are particularly
closely related, as the second is a special case of the third. Because the
third sense—referring to “the rigid motion of a geometric figure”—is the
broader sense, understanding it helps to clarify the second sense, that of
See HERMANN WEYL, SYMMETRY 5-25 (1952); Salomon Bochner, Symmetry and
Asymmetry, in 4 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 346 (1973-74), available at
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/DicHist/dict.html. The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 456
(J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds., 2d ed. 1989), lists usages corresponding to the first
sense from the sixteenth century, but usages corresponding to the second, third, and fourth
senses only from the nineteenth century on. Id.
12
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Coxe, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 170, 203 (1800) (Yeates, J.). “The
construction I have adopted, appears to me to restore perfect symmetry to the whole act,
and to preserve its due proportions.” Id.
13
See Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani, Symmetry and Symmetry Breaking, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2004), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/symmetry-breaking. Brading and
Castellani note that the term’s roots imply a correspondence of parts: “The term
‘symmetry’ derives from the Greek words sun (meaning ‘with’ or ‘together’) and metron
(‘measure’),
yielding
summetria,
and
originally
indicated
a
relation
of
commensurability . . . . It quickly acquired a further . . . meaning . . . of a proportion . . .
harmonizing the different elements into a unitary whole.” Id.
14
See DOROTHY K. WASHBURN & DONALD W. CROWE, SYMMETRIES OF CULTURE: THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF PLANE PATTERN ANALYSIS passim (1988). On the other hand, balanced
proportions do not always involve precise correspondence of parts. See, e.g., GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 602-06 (1969) (discussing
shifts in understanding of the balance involved in models of mixed government from the
balancing of complementary components to the balancing of multiple identical
components).
11
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correspondence on both sides of a dividing line, which may now be the
most widespread sense in general usage.15
Geometers identify four types of “rigid motion” giving rise to
symmetrical relationships between figures on a two-dimensional plane.16
Moving a figure in accordance with one of the motions to a new location
on a plane produces another figure, which has a relationship of
symmetry, or perfect structural correspondence, with the first. The four
symmetry-producing rigid motions are: (1) reflection across an axis,
resulting in reflective or bilateral symmetry, the second dictionary sense
of the term (found, roughly, in the human face); (2) translation along a
line, or translational symmetry (present in the holes on a belt); (3)
rotation about a point, resulting in rotational symmetry (seen in the arms
of a starfish); and (4) translation accompanied by reflection across a line
parallel to the line of translation, or glide reflectional symmetry
(exemplified by a set of footprints).17
English speakers’ use of the term “symmetry” to refer to spatial
correspondence of this variety seems to have solidified during the
nineteenth century.18 A more general use of the term to refer to
relationships—physically concrete or not—of precise correspondence
also probably first emerged in the nineteenth century, both in and
outside of legal writing.19 Legal rhetoric still uses the term in this way,
but it has been joined and, in a number of contexts, eclipsed by the
second sense—that of reflective symmetry.
This more specific second sense of the term became widely popular
later than the use of the term to refer to relationships of precise
correspondence.20 Adoption of this sense in legal writing was even more
belated. Although references to bilateral symmetry appear sporadically
in early twentieth-century legal discourse,21 this did not become a
common way of articulating abstract relationships in legal writing until

See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, passim (noting the ascendancy of this sense).
Id. at 44; Bochner, supra note 11, at 351.
17
WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 44-50.
18
BOCHNER, supra note 11, at 347, 351.
19
See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 456. The Oxford English Dictionary
dates at 1823 the first usage of the term to mean “[e]xact correspondence in position of the
several points or parts of a figure or body.” Id.
20
See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, passim.
21
See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
15
16
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the late twentieth century.22 Now, however, it seems to be becoming the
most prevalent sense in which the term is used in legal rhetoric.23
Because of this prevalence, a further word on the relation between
the bilateral sense of symmetry and the other types of geometric
symmetry is in order. In at least one significant way, reflective
symmetry is unique among the geometric symmetries: it is the only
inherently binary form of symmetry. Other types of symmetry may exist
among indeterminate or even infinite numbers of repeated figures, but in
two dimensions, a relationship of reflective symmetry by definition
exists between two figures. Metaphoric references to this conception of
symmetry to explain issues thus limit, from the beginning, the amount of
information that will be addressed in each instance.24
3.

Symmetry as Invariance

The relationship between the geometrical senses of “symmetry” and
the fourth dictionary definition—the “property of remaining invariant
under certain changes”25 attributed to physical phenomena—should now
be clear. This notion of invariance in one respect, despite transformation
in others, is simply an abstract extension of the concept of rigid motion, a
metaphorical elaboration of the geometric meaning of “symmetry.”26

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Parts II, III.A.3-III.A.5, III.D, IV.A; see also infra notes 45-53.
24
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia used the bilateral conception of symmetry to support
his argument that the restriction on legal services funding at issue was not viewpoint
discriminatory. Id. Justice Scalia pointed out that the funding ban “is symmetrical:
Litigants challenging the covered statutes . . . do not receive . . . funding, and neither do
litigants defending those laws against challenge.” Id. at 551. Justice Scalia’s designation of
all affected parties as “litigants” interchangeable but for their litigation positions permitted
his point but also limited the accuracy of his description. Id.
In other ways, reflective symmetry is clearly analogous to other geometrical symmetries.
In all cases, the parts of geometrically symmetrical figures correspond precisely to the parts
of the figures with which they are symmetrical. Thus, although bilateral symmetry is in
one sense categorically different from the other forms of geometrical symmetry, it is also
just like these other forms in that it involves a relationship of precise structural
correspondence. But see DONALD D. HOFFMAN, VISUAL INTELLIGENCE: HOW WE CREATE
WHAT WE SEE 96 (1998) (“Repetition, after all, is just translation, whereas [reflective]
symmetry is translation and reflection.”).
25
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S, supra note 10, at 1266.
26
See BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, LAWS AND SYMMETRY 243 (1990). Philosopher of science Bas
Van Fraassen explains this sense in this way: “Symmetries are transformations . . . that
leave all relevant structure intact—the result is always exactly like the original, in all
relevant respects.” Id.
22
23
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This sense, too, appears to have first gained wide usage in the
nineteenth century.27 Legal rhetoric rarely uses the term in this sense.
Still, the metaphorical extension that gave rise to this meaning of the
term hints at the incredible conceptual adaptability of the geometric
sense of the term, a phenomenon illustrated at length in Parts II.B.2 and
II.B.3 below.
B. Giving Content to Symmetry
1.

Is Symmetry an Empty Concept?

In a well-known critique of the concept of equality, Peter Westen
characterizes the concept as an “empty idea.”28 Symmetry is, like
equality, a relational concept with precise mathematical meanings and
protean legal meanings.29 Does Westen’s critique apply to the concept of
symmetry as well?30
Westen’s main point is that the concept of equality is so purely
abstract and relational that it cannot, in itself, possibly have any concrete
content—thus, it is “empty.” Although Westen never couches his point
in precisely these terms, his work describes legal reliance on the concept
of equality as a conceptual and rhetorical shortcut whose use both
permits and masks avoidance of the analysis of relevant normative
issues.31 This analysis is similar to that of the critics of the “asymmetric
See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 457. The Oxford English Dictionary
lists 1819 as the date of the first usage of the word “symmetrical” “[a]pplied to an
expression, function, or equation whose value is never altered by interchanging the values
of any two variables or unknown quantities.” Id.; see also Bochner, supra note 11, at 352-53.
28
See PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF
“EQUALITY” IN MORAL AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1990) [hereinafter WESTEN, SPEAKING OF
EQUALITY]; Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982)
[hereinafter Westen, Empty Idea].
29
See WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 262-80. Isaiah Berlin, cited by
Westen in this connection, even equated the concepts in discussing the meaning of
“equality.” See Isaiah Berlin, Equality as an Ideal, in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 128, 131 (F.
Olafson ed., 1961). “The assumption is that equality needs no reasons, only inequality does
so; that uniformity, regularity, similarity, symmetry . . . need not be specially accounted for,
whereas differences, unsystematic behaviour, change in conduct, need explanation . . . .”
Id.
30
See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 2, at 121 (noting that a danger of analysis in terms of
binaries or contraries is an excessive focus on the relation between the contraries, at the
expense of attention to the substance of the contrary elements).
31
See Westen, Empty Idea, supra note 28, at 547. In Westen’s view, the concept of equality
always borrows its substance from the rules whose application is at issue. Id. In his book,
Westen addresses how the term allows its users to avoid performing or articulating certain
communicative and cognitive tasks, primarily the precise disambiguation of allied ideas.
Id.; see also WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 262-80.
27
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threat” concept. But Westen’s insistence on addressing his subject in
exclusively abstract terms, although it is consistent with a certain
philosophical tradition, seems to foreordain his conclusion regarding the
nature of the concept of equality.32 Ultimately, his critique approaches
tautology.
In an attempt to avoid this pitfall, this Article next looks at one
approach to understanding how our experience gives content to abstract
concepts, including the conceptions of symmetry presented above.
2.

From Perception to Concept

Over the past few decades, legal scholars have fruitfully drawn on
research in cognitive science for insight into such central legal concerns
as the nature of intentional action and decision-making. Much of the
most influential work in this vein has focused on the intentions and
unconscious biases of those subject to the law33 or making the law.34
With a few exceptions, however, this type of scholarship has not applied
the insights of cognitive and behavioral science to explore the
implications of the conscious and unconscious decision-making involved
specifically in persuasive communication, or rhetoric,35 even though
some recent interdisciplinary work in cognitive science has focused
heavily on the relationships linking perception, experience, language
use, and reasoning.36 This work suggests that understanding our
32
See WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 285. This limitation is
reproduced by most of Westen’s critics. Id. Westen himself acknowledges it, albeit not as a
problem. Id.
33
See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995);
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
34
See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hansen, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2002).
35
But see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
36
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson are prominent popularizers of this particular
approach. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1987); GEORGE
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS
CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN
THE FLESH]. For other introductions to a similar approach to interdisciplinary cognitive
science, see MARK TURNER, COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE passim (2001);
FRANCISCO J. VARELA ET AL., THE EMBODIED MIND: COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND HUMAN
EXPERIENCE 7-9 (1993); ROBERT A. WILSON, BOUNDARIES OF THE MIND: THE INDIVIDUAL IN
THE FRAGILE SCIENCES: COGNITION 144-213 (2004); and Mark Anderson, How to Study the
Mind: An Introduction to Embodied Cognition, in EMBODIED COGNITION AND PERCEPTUAL
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perceptions and experiences of symmetry may be crucial to
understanding the full implications of more metaphorical and abstract
uses of the term. The following discussion explains this approach
briefly, then reviews what some researchers have learned about human
perception of symmetry in the various senses described above, before
turning to the question of how these perceptions might shape and
inform legal uses of the term.
The reasons for the appearance of abstract concepts, like that of
symmetry, in the cognitive systems of developing children are not well
understood, but the capacity appears to be a human universal.37 Based
on this fact and on experimental results, some researchers and theorists
in cognitive science have suggested that the capacity for abstraction,
including the use of language referring to abstractions, does not depend
on different brain functions from those we use in exercising our
capacities for perception and physical action. In this approach, the
building blocks of purposive action, abstract thought, and language alike
are “stable recurring patterns of sensorimotor experience,”38 or
consistent patterns of neural activity known as schemas,39 which provide
the raw material and concrete basis for our conceptual systems,
including our use of language and our reasoning.40 For example, our
LEARNING IN ADAPTIVE DEVELOPMENT (F. Santoianni & C. Sabatano eds., 2005), available at
http://cogprints.org/3945/.
37
See MORTON HUNT, THE STORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 528-29 (1993).
38
Mark Johnson & Tim Rohrer, We Are Live Creatures: Embodiment, American Pragmatism,
and the Cognitive Organism, in 1 BODY, LANGUAGE AND MIND 11, 12 (Jordan Zlatov et al.
eds., 2005).
39
See MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF IMAGINATION,
REASON, AND MEANING (1987).
40
When a person experiences a visual sensation, the stimulus activates a networked
system of connections within the person’s brain. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 67-71,
177-82; JOHN HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER 101-14 (1998); VARELA ET AL.,
supra note 36, at 93-98. Some connections take the form of “topological neural maps,”
patterned in ways corresponding to (but not reproducing or representing) the structure of
the perceived object. Johnson & Rohrer, supra note 38, at 12. Such maps are also activated
by motor activity, as well as by reading, imagining, and reasoning—and the neural maps
activated by mental activities that we typically understand to be distinct from physical
experience in fact overlap significantly with those activated by physical perception or
manipulation. Id. at 8-13; Tim Rohrer, Image Schemata in the Brain, in FROM PERCEPTION TO
MEANING: IMAGE SCHEMAS IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 7-23 (Beate Hempe & Joe Grady eds.,
2005). Thus, experiments have shown that “abstract reasoning about economics can be
done by the same structured neural network that has the capacity to control high-level
motor schemas.” LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 36, at 583
(citing S. Narayanan, Embodiment in Language Understanding: Sensory-Motor
Representations for Metaphoric Reasoning About Event Descriptions (1997) (unpublished
Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley). In other words, perception, action, and abstract
conceptualization may not involve fundamentally different types of brain processes. Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/8

Petroski: The Rhetoric of Symmetry

2007]

The Rhetoric of Symmetry

1175

physical experience with containers and their contents generates a stable
schema that we use to interact with and draw inferences about not just
actual containers of all kinds, but also our selves, our minds, and our
creations.41
On this view, when we identify particular abstract
relationships as “symmetrical,” and then draw inferences based on those
references, we are using schemas drawn from our perceptions of and
experience with concrete relationships or phenomena that we would also
identify as symmetrical, such as the human body and many architectural
structures.
What has research shown about how we actually experience those
concrete relationships and phenomena? One theorist of perception,
Michael Leyton, has gone so far as to hypothesize that the mental
reconstruction of symmetry, a condition he equates with
“indistinguishability,” is the basis of all perception.42 His view is fairly
radical and not particularly widespread,43 although some of Leyton’s
conclusions are shared more widely. For instance, many vision theorists
hold that people tend to “interpret image motions as projections of rigid
motions in three dimensions”—that is, they experience perceived motion
as if it were occurring through the generation of geometric symmetries.44
This is one explanation of the process that allows us to feel that we see
continuous motion when presented with a sequence of static images, as
in a flipbook or a film, and it is fully consistent with Leyton’s theory. On
the other hand, in a conclusion that appears to contradict Leyton’s
theory, the physiological psychologist Bela Julesz proposed that “the
visual system encodes reflection symmetry but not direct repetition[,]”

Further, one approach to the nature of reasoning holds that we draw inferences based on
the “entailments” of our cognitive schemas—features, properties, and functional aspects of
the underlying concrete schemas. Id. Among the entailments of the container schema, for
instance, are the facts that we can put things into and take things out of containers and that
it may be easier to perceive a container than it is to perceive its contents. Id. We use these
features to reach conclusions not only about containers but also about things, including
other abstract concepts, that we liken to them. Id.; see also LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS
WE LIVE BY, supra note 36, at 9, 17-19; LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra
note 36, passim; Jacqueline P. Leighton, Defining and Describing Reason, in THE NATURE OF
REASONING 13 (Jacqueline P. Leighton & Robert J. Sternberg eds., 2004).
41
See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 36, at 29-32; LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 36, at 341, 379-90.
42
See MICHAEL LEYTON, SYMMETRY, CAUSALITY, MIND (1992).
43
Leyton approaches vision and cognition as modular, simplifying processes. Compare
id., with WILSON, supra note 36, 172-80, 232-41 (discussing theorists who take a different
approach to the conceptualization of vision).
44
HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 159.
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or translation symmetry.45 Julesz based this conclusion on experiments
in which he showed subjects two types of images. Both types involved
the repetition of small arrays of randomly spaced dots. In one set of
images, the arrays were repeated through translation, as in a wallpaper
pattern. In the other set, the arrays were repeated through reflection.
Subjects recognized the reflected arrays as instances of repetition more
readily and consistently than they recognized the translated arrays as
instances of repetition. Julesz’s experiments seemed to show that people
might be in some sense hard-wired to perceive reflective symmetry, and
also that they prefer reflective symmetry to simple correspondence.
In line with this preference, most other experimental studies
investigating the perception of symmetry have focused on reflective
symmetry alone, and not in comparison with translational symmetry.46
It is possible that researchers are predisposed to identify bilateral
symmetry as an interesting topic for research by their own tendency to
perceive it more readily.47 Much of the experimental data may therefore
beg the question of the reason for the predisposition. But even with
these limitations, recent studies have provided interesting information
regarding our perception of—and strong preference for—bilateral
symmetry. People prefer bilaterally symmetrical figures to asymmetrical
ones.48
Generally, people are also able to reproduce bilaterally
symmetrical figures more accurately than asymmetrical ones.49 The
preference for bilateral symmetry is so strong, in fact, that people will
unconsciously distort asymmetrical figures to see them as symmetrical.50
45
WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 19. This conclusion was based on experiments
in which Julesz demonstrated that “the eye distinguishes between sections of dot arrays
which are repeated from array sections which are reflected across a mirror plane.” Id.; see
also CHRIS MCMANUS, RIGHT HAND, LEFT HAND: THE ORIGINS OF ASYMMETRY IN BRAINS,
BODIES, ATOMS AND CULTURES 350-52 (2002).
46
See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 14, 19. For a discussion of Ernst Mach, who
likely conducted the first experimental studies of human perception of symmetry in the
late nineteenth century, see HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 95-97 (describing some of Mach’s
experiments); MCMANUS, supra note 45, at 352 (same); and WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note
14, at 19-24 (providing synopsis of research on perception of symmetry).
47
See HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 95-97 (discussing the flaws of Mach’s experiments).
48
WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 21. This preference may not constrain
conceptions of human attractiveness as much as was popularized in recent decades.
Compare Geoffrey Cowley & Karen Springer, The Biology of Beauty, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1996,
at 60 (setting forth popular notion that facial symmetry is directly correlated with
perceived attractiveness), with Dahlia Zaidel & Jennifer Cohen, The Face, Beauty, and
Symmetry: Perceiving Asymmetry in Beautiful Faces, 115 INT’L J. NEUROSCIENCE 1165 (2005),
available at http://cogprints.org/4601/ (finding that subjects detected asymmetry in
beauty, and suggesting that faces considered beautiful can be functionally asymmetrical).
49
WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 21, 23.
50
Id. at 21.
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And vertical bilateral symmetry—symmetry on both sides of a vertical
axis—is the most perceptually salient form of symmetry.51 This salience
may be a human universal,52 although developmental and cultural
variations exist in the ease with which people perceive reflective
symmetry around axes that are other than vertical.53
This research indicates that the term “symmetry,” at least in the
geometric and bilateral senses, refers to a type of perception that we
respond to differently from other perceptions. Perception research has
also not included research into our perceptions of symmetry in the
holistic sense, as such, but researchers have explored our aesthetic
perceptions and preferences and our reactions to simplicity and
complexity. Much research has found strong preferences for cognitive
efficiency,54 or simplicity and familiarity, and closure.55 But we are not
driven only by a need to reduce cognitive complexity and resolve
conflict. Experiments on animals and humans have also shown a
universal “cognitive need . . . for mental stimulation” in the form of a
moderate level of variety and complexity.56 Subjects given a choice
between a featureless environment and a stimulating one invariably
choose the latter.57
How do these experimental findings help us to understand the
various notions of symmetry described above and, beyond that, the uses
of the term in legal communication? First, our drives toward cognitive
efficiency and closure, combined with our preference for limited variety,
suggest an explanation for the longevity of the holistic conception of
symmetry. Ultimately, when we use the term in this sense we seem to be
MCMANUS, supra note 45, at 350-52; WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 21-22.
WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 24.
53
Id. at 21-22; MICHAEL C. CORBALLIS, THE LOPSIDED APE: EVOLUTION OF THE
GENERATIVE MIND 129 (1991).
54
See HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 27-46; Chen & Hanson, supra note 34, at 1128, 1140-68;
Maxwell J. Roberts, Heuristics and Reasoning I: Making Deduction Simple, in THE NATURE OF
REASONING 234 (Jacqueline P. Leighton & Robert J. Sternberg eds., 2004).
55
Dan Simon has devoted several articles to explaining his experimental demonstration
of coherence, a form of logical closure, as a cognitive constraint and applying these findings
to legal decision-making. See, e.g., Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision
Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision
Making]; Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decisionmaking, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004); Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Look Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1097 (2002); see also
Johnson & Rohrer, supra note 38, at 13.
56
HUNT, supra note 37, at 493-94.
57
Id. at 494 (citing ROBERT A. BARON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIOR
320 (1980)); ROSS BUCK, HUMAN MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 356 (1988)).
51
52
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referring to our satisfaction at attaining a coherent perception or
conceptualization.58 Because it refers to the result of a process, this
conception does not imply any need for further action or analysis; it
presupposes the prior satisfactory completion of a process without
implying anything in particular about the nature of that process. The
“balanced proportions”59 involved may, in some cases, be akin to
bilateral reflection, but could just as easily be other relationships we are
disposed to perceive as pleasing, possibly because of the frequency with
which we encounter them.60 When we achieve or need to assert that we
have achieved comprehension of the solution to a problem, it is therefore
natural to think of and describe the achievement in terms of a diffuse,
pleasing holism.61 This holism is not a property of the problem itself, or
a property of its parts or the process of its solution, but a feature we
attribute to its solution.
The observations described above also suggest ways to be more
specific about the significance of the concept of bilateral symmetry. As
noted above, this type of symmetry is an especially salient visual pattern
and conceptual schema.62 Its perceptual salience is paralleled by its
prevalence in linguistic usage and experimental inquiry, as well as the
growing predominance of reflective symmetry over translational
symmetry in legal conceptualization.63 Schemas of reflective symmetry
are particularly powerful because their binary simplicity efficiently
satisfies both our drive toward moderate complexity and our drive
toward closure—they embody both variety and completeness.64 In
several regards, this schema also bears directly on our selfconceptualization as active individuals and social beings. For instance, it
has been suggested that we associate vertical reflective symmetry not
only with humanity, as the human body outwardly appears bilaterally
symmetrical,65 but also with the capacity for effective directed action, as
a creature lacking bilaterally symmetrical appendages cannot move in a

See Chen & Hanson, supra note 34; supra note 55.
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S, supra note 10, at 1266.
60
See infra Part V.B.2.
61
See supra note 55; infra note 302.
62
See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text; see also TURNER, supra note 36, at 41-42
(identifying symmetry as among the strong regularities in the construction of meaning).
63
See infra Parts III, IV.D.
64
See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 2, at 115. “[T]he most significant truth is a simultaneous
statement of opposing truths.” Id.
65
See WEYL, supra note 11, at 3. But see MCMANUS, supra note 45, at 95 (noting that the
human body is actually characterized by “external symmetry coupled with a gross internal
asymmetry of the viscera”).
58
59
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straight line.66 A bilaterally reflective symmetrical schema can also
structure our conceptualization of the most rudimentary form of social
existence: interaction between two individuals, at least when observed
passively by a third party.67 But at the same time, reflective symmetry is
linked to schemas of stasis; we perceive something like reflective
symmetry when we perceive substances in absolute equilibrium, like
items on a balancing scale.68
Bilateral symmetry schemas thus
paradoxically and powerfully embody both action and its nullification.69
These properties appeal simultaneously to our drives toward cognitive
efficiency and closure70 and to our drive toward manageable
complexity.71
3.

Symmetry in the Constructed World

Cognitive scientists and those drawing on their work have studied
not only the experiences of individuals, but also human interactions and
other environmental factors as cognitive context.72 The notion of
distributed or extended cognition73 refers to the ways in which
“successful cognition often requires many functionally interacting agents
and instruments, no one of whom conducts the thinking entirely or even
mostly.”74 This approach notes the human tendency to “offload”
cognition on to artifacts, such as written records and computers, and
institutions, such as language and social organization, and it takes those
factors to be integral parts of our cognitive apparatus.75 This approach
also stresses the extent to which cognition is an interactive, not passive,
See generally CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 81, 101, 206; MCMANUS, supra note 45, at 9194; WEYL, supra note 11, at 27.
67
See PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 48-66 (2004).
68
WEYL, supra note 11, at 25.
69
Cf. Bochner, supra note 11, at 349-51 (discussing limitations of notion of bilateral
symmetry).
70
See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
71
See HUNT, supra note 37, at 493-94.
72
See generally EDWIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD (1995); LAKOFF & JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 36, at 107.
73
See HUTCHINS, supra note 72; WILSON, supra note 36; cf. MARY DOUGLAS, HOW
INSTITUTIONS THINK (1987).
74
TURNER, supra note 36, at 46. “[H]uman beings arrange their environments to serve,
extend, and alter their thinking, or, metaphorically, rely on their environments to do some
of their thinking for them.” Id. Robert Wilson terms this “exploitative representation” and
presents the example of using a pen and paper to perform simple mathematical
computations. WILSON, supra note 36, at 162-80, 291.
75
See, e.g., CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 63-75; TERRENCE W. DEACON, THE SYMBOLIC
SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND THE BRAIN 402-05 (1997); WILSON, supra
note 36, at 183-307.
66
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process.76 The approach is relevant to understanding the various senses
of symmetry in legal rhetoric in at least two ways.
First, the fact that the experience of those involved in creating legal
rhetoric involves a large number of human-made artifacts may shed
some light on their, and our, metaphoric use of schemas of translational
symmetry. The discussion above noted that people may be less disposed
to perceive translational symmetry than they are to perceive reflective
symmetry.
Yet humans are also clearly drawn to translational
symmetry; people across cultures have had a striking tendency to create
artifacts including not only reflectional, but also translational and glidereflective symmetries as components of their design and, more recently,
to create and value artifacts that are translationally symmetrical in the
sense that they are, for all practical purposes, identical to one another.77
Mass-produced artifacts exhibiting symmetries of both types now
pervade the perceptible lived environments of many people more
extensively than do any natural symmetries.78 This development affects
perception and, as a consequence, thinking.
For instance, a person who grows up in a city surrounded by
structures with many geometrically symmetrical features will actually
develop a slightly different perceptual apparatus from a person who
does not develop while surrounded by similar stimuli.79 This different
perceptual apparatus will make different cognitive schemas available to
that person. Increasingly, these symmetries seem to be a given. Yet it is
always evident that they are created, rather than natural. They bespeak
controlled, predictable, and thus comforting repetition, on the one hand,
and endless proliferation, on the other. They threaten to overwhelm us,
See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 36, at 221.
Aesthetic and functional creations in many cultures recreate symmetries
compulsively. See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 7. Conceptual creations also
exhibit this tendency. See LEYTON, supra note 42; see also J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline
Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986).
78
See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 13; cf., e.g., CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 308;
LEYTON, supra note 42, at 586-98.
79
See HUNT, supra note 37, at 454-55. “Line detector” cells in the visual cortex become
specialized through use and development to respond to vertical and horizontal lines. Id.
Kittens raised in an environment lacking vertical lines will develop a visual apparatus
unable to perceive such lines. “Similarly, people reared in cities have more exposure to
vertical and horizontal lines during early childhood than to lines oriented otherwise, and
develop a greater sensitivity to the former.” Id. (citing R.B. Annis & B. Frost, Human Visual
Ecology and Orientation Anistrophies in Acuity, 182 SCIENCE 729-31 (1973)); see also LEYTON,
supra note 42, at 596 (“Mass production . . . creates an environment that is a hierarchy
purely of symmetries, and this ensures that behavior is a hierarchy purely of
symmetries.”).
76
77
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yet imply a history of human control.80 As the discussion below shows,
the ambivalence inherent in this conceptual schema, which is slightly
different from the ambivalence inherent in references to bilateral
symmetry, has also found its way into legal rhetoric.
The second insight provided by the notion of distributed cognition is
the perspective it suggests on the legal system itself, a perspective
complemented by the role that the concept of symmetry has played in
legal rhetoric, as discussed more fully below. To date, legal scholarship
that has drawn on cognitive science research focused mostly on the
cognition of individuals, not on interpersonal or institutional cognition.81
But this focus is not inherent in the nature of either subject. Both courts
and legal discourse are tools with which people solve complex problems
that they cannot solve on their own, either because they individually lack
sufficient cognitive resources82 or because diverse perceptions and
interests make it impossible for each individual personally involved in
the problems to accommodate all relevant perspectives on a state of
affairs.83 In this way, legal systems can be understood as cognitive
systems, even though they are transpersonal systems.84 Procedural
devices, such as rules of evidence, juries, discovery rules, and other
mechanisms for the generation of consensual facts, are paradigmatic
examples of distributed cognition. So is the form of the reasoned judicial

80
See, e.g., CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 308 (“The proliferation of objects means that we
need different and more economical ways to represent them in our minds.”); see also JEAN
BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Farina Glaser, trans., 1994); WALTER
BENJAMIN, THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION (1937);
CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 182-86, 195-97.
81
See, e.g., WINTER, supra note 35; sources cited supra note 36. This may be in part
because of the difficulties in working out clear models of extended cognition. See generally
DOUGLAS, supra note 73; WILSON, supra note 36, at 265-307.
82
See DOUGLAS, supra note 73, at 111-28.
83
Many anthropologists of law take a similar view. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry,
Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2063 (1987); see also KARL LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1930) (describing law as “[w]hat . . . officials do about disputes”)
(emphasis omitted). Certain areas of law, such as the law of agency, contracts, and
corporations, do acknowledge and institutionalize the necessarily social, extended nature
of cognition.
84
See DOUGLAS, supra note 73.
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opinion.85 The cognitive work performed by judicial opinions is, indeed,
a crucial part of the social and political work they perform.86
Another aspect of the American legal system performing an
important distributed cognitive function more commonly recognized as
such is the legal academy. But this function extends beyond the
education of students.87 The work produced by legal scholars also
performs self-evidently, and often self-consciously, collective problemsolving functions.88 Yet, as Part III demonstrates, this function of legal
scholarship does not always inform scholars’ methods. Legal scholars’
use of the concept of symmetry provides an instructive case study of this
phenomenon.
III. SYMMETRY IN RECENT LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
In the past two or three decades, legal scholars have increasingly
relied on conceptual schemas of symmetry to organize their analyses and
recommendations.89 But the concept has been subjected to surprisingly
85
For traditional justifications, see, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960
Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 64-65, 76-77 (1961) [hereinafter
Bickel, The Passive Virtues]; Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN L. REV. 633, 653-59
(1995); and David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737-38
(1987).
86
Opinions publicize the conceptual bases for the resolution of conflicts in a way
allowing affected individuals to integrate that resolution into their own lives, see JOHN M.
CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF
LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); DOUGLAS, supra note 73, and facilitating the resolution of other
problems by other participants in the legal system, including other courts and legislatures.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 156, 162-63, 240 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH]; Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 85, at 50-51, 56, 60-64.
87
For example, the type of learning encouraged through Socratic dialogue is, contrary to
received wisdom, not unique to legal education, but institutionalized throughout legal
practice. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 33-34 (1998); see also BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH, supra note 86, at 156.
88
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 85, at 731.
89
Work in the 1950s and early 1960s introduced the concepts of information and other
asymmetries into economic and political analysis. See, e.g., DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF
COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 58 (1958); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
Otherwise, the earliest example of legal scholarship relying on the concept of symmetry for
organizational or normative purposes revealed in the research for this project dates from
1965. Charles D. Tarlton, Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical
Speculation, 27 J. POL. 861 (1965). For other early examples, see David Gray Adler, The
Framers and Treaty Termination: A Matter of Symmetry, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 891; William C.
Gifford, Jr., United States Tax Effects of Foreign Losses: A Symmetry Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 312
(1973); and Luther M. Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals: A Threat to Judicial
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little analysis. One scholar, Robert Laurence, has critically analyzed the
sense of the term “symmetry” used in physics in connection with his
examination of patterns in federal Indian law doctrine.90 Two others,
Barbara Flagg and Katherine Goldwasser, have advanced a brief
assessment of the function of symmetry as a norm in legal discourse.91
But these approaches, discussed below, are not exhaustive analyses of
the concept. They are also anomalous; most commonly, legal scholars
note the extent to which concepts of balance (reflective symmetry)92 and
equality (translational symmetry)93 underpin legal thought, then stop
analysis at the point of this identification, reducing the schemas to a
priori principles.94
A comprehensive study of the use of the schemas in legal
scholarship would require a great deal of space. This survey presents
just a few illustrations of how the schemas work in legal scholarship in
order to clarify why the present study is needed.
A. Uses of Symmetry in Legal Scholarship
1.

Symmetry as an Organizing Device

In recent decades, legal scholars have increasingly used the concept
of symmetry, mainly in the bilateral sense, to organize presentation of
their insights. Matter organized in this way ranges from the domain of
legal doctrine at its most abstract level, conceived as an ordered system
built on conceptual opposition,95 through the relationships and tensions

Symmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976). As other examples cited in this section suggest, the
number of articles giving a prominent place to the concept has increased greatly since the
1990s, as has the volume of legal scholarship generally.
90
Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861
(2000).
91
Barbara Flagg & Katherine Goldwasser, Fighting for Truth, Justice, and the Asymmetrical
Way, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 105 (1998).
92
See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 159 (2d ed. 1994) (“[J]ustice is
traditionally thought of as maintaining or restoring a balance or proportion.”); WINTER, supra
note 35, at 16, 115 (“It is hard to imagine a system of moral reasoning that is not motivated
by the BALANCE schema.”); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 36, 48-53 (1971)
(describing device of “reflective equilibrium”).
93
See, e.g., HART, supra note 92, at 159; RAWLS, supra note 92, at 54-60; John E. Coons,
Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59, 99-103 (1987).
94
See, e.g., Coons, supra note 93.
95
See, e.g., Leo Katz, What We Do When We Do What We Do and Why We Do It, 37 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 753, 754 (2000) (citing Weyl, supra note 11, for the proposition that “the best
way to explore any subject you are interested in . . . is to explore its symmetries and
asymmetries”); cf. Balkin, supra note 77.
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among various constitutional principles,96 to highly specific doctrinal
questions.97
In this work scholars usually adopt the reflective sense of symmetry,
apparently for its familiarity, its simplicity, and its analytic
implications.98 The normative implications of the conception in this type
of scholarship consist mainly of the ways in which bilaterally
symmetrical organization implies that analytic possibilities are
exhausted once contraries are considered. This vein of scholarship
assumes that the utility of the concept is self-evident and makes no
explicit claims about the normative value of any sense of symmetry.
2.

Symmetry as a Norm

Scholars have also used the concept of symmetry in more selfconsciously normative ways.99 Normative use of the bilateral sense of
symmetry is especially common in contexts conventionally
conceptualized in oppositional terms, such as questions of procedure in
the adversary system100 and questions surrounding private economic
transactions.101 In both contexts, scholars sometimes use the concept of
symmetry to argue for the establishment of a regime that is asymmetrical
in some way. This type of argument presumes that a state of symmetry
is the default norm and justifies departures from that norm.102 More

96
See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Constitutional Asymmetry, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2073 (2001);
Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2005);
Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV.
641 (2001).
97
See, e.g., Kenneth D. Heath, The Symmetries of Citizenship: Welfare, Expatriate Taxation,
and Stakeholding, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 533 (1999) (addressing rules governing acquisition
and relinquishment of citizenship along with federal statutory creation of financial burdens
and benefits in the United States).
98
See Katz, supra note 95; see also supra notes 24, 62-71 and accompanying text.
99
Unlike contemporary courts, scholars virtually never use the term normatively in the
holistic sense.
100
This is true particularly in the context of criminal trials and sentencing. See, e.g.,
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy’s Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What Purpose Do They
Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341 (2002); Evan J. Mandery, Notions of Symmetry and Self in Death
Penalty Jurisprudence (with Implications for the Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence), 15
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 471 (2004); Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New
Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41 (2000).
101
See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249 (2003); Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph
A. Winter, Asset Securitization and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (2005).
102
For instance, Evan J. Mandery argues that evidentiary rules in capital sentencing
hearings should be based on clearer awareness of the asymmetry of error risks in that
context. Mandery, supra note 100.
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often, however, commentators present reflective symmetry as a norm
toward which the existing asymmetrical regime should be reformed.103
In a brief analysis of the function of the norm of bilateral symmetry
in legal scholarship, Barbara Flagg and Katherine Goldwasser note
commentators’ tendencies to presume symmetry as the default measure
of “fairness.”104 They urge resistance to this tendency, contending that
adherence to a norm of bilateral symmetry in legal reasoning and
doctrine reinforces existing inegalitarian distributions of resources and
power.105 Like the many similar critiques discussed in Part IV, however,
this one ultimately depends on an appeal to the same norm. Flagg and
Goldwasser advocate doctrinal asymmetry in areas such as
antidiscrimination and criminal law to counteract existing social and
economic asymmetries—in other words, they presume that bilateral
asymmetry, once perceived or conceived of, requires correction.106 Flagg
and Goldwasser do not acknowledge this inconsistency or provide clear
guidelines for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable symmetries.
Still, Flagg and Goldwasser’s general point is borne out by other
scholars’ reliances on the concept to show the legitimacy of portions of
the existing legal regime.107 This use of the concept of symmetry is
similar to its use to organize a discussion; both rely on the concept to
make an area of doctrine coherent. But arguments justifying the status
quo by reference to bilateral symmetry obviously add normative
implications not present in purely organizational uses of the concept.
Approaches in this vein propose that parts of the world should be
perceived as or made symmetrical by courts and other legal actors. In
this, such normative arguments are similar to some of the uses of the
concept in legal rhetoric discussed in Part IV.
B. Robert Laurence’s Work on Indian Law
One scholar, Robert Laurence, has critically examined the concept of
symmetry before using it to organize his account of historical patterns in
103
Thus, Stephen T. Parr argues that existing Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
doctrine should be reformed so that disproportionally lenient penalties are also considered
unconstitutional. Parr, supra note 100; see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003).
104
Flagg & Goldwasser, supra note 91, at 108-09.
105
Id. at 109-12.
106
Id. at 108-09.
107
See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Saul Levmore, Takings,
Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333 (1991).
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federal Indian law.108 Laurence’s analysis focuses on the sense of the
term used in physics. He makes this focus seem natural by noting how
this sense of symmetry characterizes the laws of physics. Laurence
acknowledges only in passing, however, an important difference
between the domains of physical and human “law,” noting that humans
“construct[ ] the law; [they do] not just describe it,” as physicists claim to
do.109 This Article considers this difference—the constructedness of
law—to be more central than Laurence does to an understanding of how
the concept of symmetry has functioned in legal thought and rhetoric.
But Laurence’s analysis also yields important insights built on in the
discussion below.
For one thing, Laurence stresses the importance of perspective and
frames of reference in the perception and attribution of symmetry.110
Symmetry may be visible within one frame of reference but invisible
within another:
[I]magine a formal dinner in the State Dining Room at
the White House, and begin with the china: The plate in
front of you is probably bilaterally symmetric, or
perhaps symmetric about a point . . . Pull back, and the
place setting is bilaterally asymmetric: forks on the left,
knives and spoons on the right, napkin and crystal in a
lopsided arrangement. Pull back. The table itself is
likely bilaterally symmetric, with the same number of
chairs on both sides. (Or symmetric about the center if
the table is round). . . . Pull back and the State Dining
Room itself is revealed to be bilaterally asymmetric, with
fireplaces on one side, but not the other. Pull back, and
the White House itself is largely a symmetric
building . . . Pull back farther, and one sees the largely
symmetric layout of Washington, D.C. Finally, North
America is . . . asymmetric when viewed from afar.111
Laurence’s observations recall the critiques of the “asymmetric
threat” concept discussed in Part I.112 His illustration reemphasizes the
extent to which perceptions of symmetry result from processes of

108
109
110
111
112
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See Laurence, supra note 90, at 865-934.
Id. at 878.
Many laws of physics, Laurence notes, “are not symmetric as to scale.” Id. at 869.
Id. at 870-72.
See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
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selection and decision-making or selective inattention, even when they
are experienced as passive reactions to the environment.
Second, like Flagg and Goldwasser, Laurence questions the habit of
unreflecting reliance on symmetry as a norm and advocates asymmetry
in certain areas of legal doctrine.113 Also like Flagg and Goldwasser, he
relies on the norm at the same time, noting that “asymmetry in the broad
sense of departures from universal uniformity is at times essential for
balance[,]” by which Laurence means the equilibrium of opposing forces
or interests.114 Like Flagg and Goldwasser, Laurence does not explain
when such equilibrium is desirable and when it is to be resisted.
Ultimately, he too seems to consider the normative value of the concept
to be self-evident.115
Although Laurence’s analysis is more sustained than any other legal
commentator’s, his perspective remains external. No legal scholar has
examined how the concept actually functions within legal rhetoric and,
by implication, within legal thought. This failure is unfortunate. As the
next sections attempt to show, these functions are fascinatingly pervasive
and suggestive. For a long time, they have been shaping legal reasoning
and rhetoric in ways that we have never fully recognized.
IV. CONCEPTIONS OF SYMMETRY IN LEGAL RHETORIC AND REASONING
From its origins, legal writing in the United States has consistently
linked the three conceptions of symmetry described above to different
aspects of the functions those writers tacitly declare the legal system, and
particularly courts, to be performing. These functions fall into five
categories, which structure the discussion below:
doing justice,
remaining faithful to the purposes of other lawmakers, making coherent
law, correcting for market imperfections, and justifying conclusions.
In each area, judicial opinion writers have used conceptions of
symmetry to describe what they are doing, but they have also
paradoxically used the concept to articulate the passivity of courts.
Often, these writers use the concept of symmetry to locate the decision or
norm that disposes of the issue at hand somewhere other than in the
adjudicative process. Even when the writers acknowledge their own
responsibility for attributing symmetrical or asymmetrical relationships
See, e.g., Laurence, supra note 90, at 874-87.
Id. at 880.
115
Cf. WEYL, supra note 11, at 13 (“Even in asymmetric designs one feels symmetry as the
norm from which one deviates under the influence of forces of non-formal character.”).
113
114
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to phenomena, their use of the concepts rarely, if ever, acknowledges the
contingency of these perceptions—the fact that symmetry is not inherent
in the phenomena examined, but results from active selection of or
selective inattention to features of those phenomena. Like legal scholars,
but for much longer, writers responsible for making law have largely
treated conceptions of symmetry as self-evident principles driving
reasoning and guiding decision-making. The conceptions drive legal
decision-making and articulation, but because their meanings and uses
vary so widely, the meaning and significance of the concept is far from
self-evident.
A. Doing Justice
1.

Symmetry as Justice or Fairness

Sometimes, opinion writers simply equate conceptions of symmetry
with fairness or justice in the most abstract, general sense. A writer
implicitly asserts that a result is just because it is symmetrical, and vice
versa, but does not otherwise explain the meaning of the concepts or the
connection between them. Early uses in this vein imply that the concepts
entail one another, or that an asymmetrical result could not possibly be
fair.116 Over time, opinion writers have come more often to present
symmetry and justice as correlated properties of the correct result
without asserting a logical relation between them.117 The concepts of
symmetry and basic fairness remain strong rhetorical partners to this
day.118
These references to symmetry are usually so glancing that it is
difficult to identify their relation to any particular cognitive schema or
more specific conception of symmetry. In recent opinions, such as
Justice Scalia’s 2001 dissent in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the
116
See, e.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Holley, 30 Kan. 465, 473 (1883) (“Thus a symmetry and
order will be preserved which will tend to secure truth and justice.”); Hertzog v. Ellis, 3
Binn. 209, 1810 WL 1362, at *2 (Pa. Dec. 22, 1810) (argument for defendant) (referring to
“defac[ing] and destroy[ing] the symmetry of judicial proceedings, which is as essential to
their justice as it is to their beauty”).
117
See, e.g., Sarlund v. Anderson, 205 F.3d 973, 974 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.) (“[The case
being distinguished] shifts the emphasis from considerations of dignity, deterrence,
respect, propriety, and symmetry found in a number of earlier cases . . . .”); Donatelli v.
Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 471 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he inquiry illustrates the
essential symmetry and fairness of the result which we reach . . . .”); Cavnar v. Quality
Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 (Tex. 1985) (“The time has come to revise
the . . . rule to make injured parties whole and restore equity and symmetry to this area of
the law.”).
118
See discussion supra note 24.
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reference often appears to be to reflective symmetry.119 But even when
this is the case, such references carry holistic implications. Equating
symmetry with fairness allows a writer to justify a legal conclusion by
characterizing it, impressionistically, as a perceptible whole embracing
parts related in some satisfactory but unspecified manner.
Opinion writers have also linked symmetry to fairness in more
specific ways. Some prevalent approaches link the concept of symmetry
to fairness in various procedural aspects of adjudication. Before
describing these approaches, this discussion looks briefly at the types of
contrasts opinion writers have drawn between symmetry and fairness.
2.

Fair Asymmetry

Since at least the late nineteenth century, judicial writing has also
repeatedly contrasted symmetry with fairness or justice. This tradition
defines the task of rendering justice in opposition to that of achieving or
perceiving symmetry, which is usually in turn linked to other negatively
valued concepts. The approach hints at a self-aware use of the concept.
But in various ways, writing using this approach usually stops short of
full analysis and, like writing that links symmetry with fairness, backs
off from assertions of agency. The tendency is, instead, to acknowledge
and then reject the self-evident attractiveness of symmetry in favor of the
self-evident authority of another norm, presented as the basis for the
result attained.
This approach seems to have first appeared in late nineteenthcentury judicial opinions. Courts at this time sometimes aligned their
common-law functions with doing justice and opposed these tasks to
legal “science”120 or “theory,”121 which they characterized as symmetrical
in a sense combining implications of holism and correspondence or
comprehensiveness and precision.

531 U.S. 533, 551 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Benton v. Burbank, 54 N.H. 583 (1874) (“If the question . . . were merely technical
and abstract, or one having relation to the symmetry and consistency of the law as a science
rather than to its practical application and administration, a decision in favor of the ruling
would give occasion for less uneasiness.”).
121
See Ash v. Cummings, 50 N.H. 591 (1872) (“[I]t is easy enough to give neat definitions
and profound symmetrical theories; but the difficulty is, to make the definitions and
theories square themselves with principles known to be sound . . . .”); see also George’s
Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Edgerton, J., dissenting)
(citing Fleming James, Jr., Contribution Among Joint TortFeasors, A Pragmatic Criticism, 54
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1159 (1941)) (“The common law rule . . . should . . . be retained, even
though it mars a theoretical symmetry in the law . . . .”).
119
120
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A more specific type of distinction between doing practical justice in
the individual case and conforming to theoretical symmetries entered
opinion writing around the turn of the twentieth century.122 An
important example of this approach is Justice Holmes’s frequently
quoted statement in his 1914 opinion for the Supreme Court in Patsone v.
Pennsylvania: “A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The
question is a practical one dependent upon experience.”123 This assertion
seems at least to hint at a court’s active role in determining “practical”
answers to questions on the basis of specific judicial and social
“experience.”124 But similar, later references do not follow up on the
hint.
Instead, in later opinions employing oppositions between
particular facts and abstract symmetry,125 writers refer key decisions—
expressly turning in part on perspective-dependent perceptions of
symmetry—to other bodies:
school districts, lower courts, and
administrative agencies.126
The contrast between practical reality and theoretical symmetry
continues to function effectively in legal rhetoric127 and does not in every
122
See, e.g., Jordahl v. Berry, 75 N.W. 10, 11 (Minn. 1898) (“[I]t is more important to work
practical justice than to preserve the logical symmetry of a rule . . . .”).
123
232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914). But compare Holmes’s famous dictum several decades earlier
in THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). In Patsone, the Court held that a state statute forbidding
possession of a firearm by a noncitizen did not violate either treaty obligations or the
Fourteenth Amendment. The above language from Patsone is still quoted. See, e.g., Walker
v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Ky. 2004).
124
Patsone, 232 U.S. at 144.
125
See Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178, 190 (8th Cir. 1968) (“It is misleading to think that
‘balance’ means exact symmetry or equilibrium of the races. Numerical quotas or
percentages, although appealing for their simplicity, lack that equitable flexibility . . . .”);
Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 24 (5th Cir. 1966) (“Although there is an apparent appeal to the
ostensibly logical symmetry of a declaration forbidding race consideration in both
exclusion and inclusion, it is both theoretically and actually unrealistic.”); Mary Carter
Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654, 660 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring specially) (“The
variety of problems dealt with [by administrative agencies] make . . . perfect symmetry[ ]
impossible. And the law reflects its good sense by not exacting it.”).
126
In Kemp v. Beasley, the Eighth Circuit concluded that race-based assignment of faculty
to schools to correspond with the racial makeup of the student bodies violated equal
protection principles. 389 F.2d 178, 190 (1968). In Brooks v. Beto, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
trial court’s refusal to grant a new trial on the ground of claimed jury bias due to
disproportionate racial representation. 366 F.2d 1, 24 (1968). In Mary Carter Paint Co.,
Judge Brown opposed symmetry to practicality in agency decision-making to establish a
general presumption of legitimacy for such decision-making. 333 F.2d 654, 660 (1964).
127
See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980) (Burger, J.) (“While
symmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required.”); Lumen Constr.,
Inc. v. Brant Constr. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1985) (“In analyzing whether
[abstention is indicated], we look not for formal symmetry between the two actions, but for
a substantial likelihood that the state litigation will dispose of all claims . . . .”); see also
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case involve a denial of judicial agency.128 Yet it most often seems to
involve such a denial. Opinion and other writers frequently refer to the
intuited and unelaborated dictates of “practical experience” as selfevident alternative rules of decision. Moreover, even when they reject
the concept of symmetry as a norm, these writers link the concept to
passivity. References to the priority of experience over abstraction tend,
when they explain the rejection of symmetry at all, to explain that
rejection on the basis of the inflexibility of the concept of symmetry
rather than on that of its contingent nature, which might lend it to
arbitrary application and unpredictable results.129 In this connection,
symmetry is rejected because it does not permit active decision-making,
or requires an unnecessary and deliberate deviation from the intuitively
correct result.
To be fair, the approaches discussed so far appear in general
statements that the opinion writers themselves likely would not deny are
conclusory. But similar patterns appear when those writers use the
concept to describe more specific aspects of courts’ roles in ensuring
procedural fairness. The next sections address four forms of this
approach.
3.

Symmetry in Civil Procedure

Despite large shifts in the practical details of civil procedure, United
States opinion writers have consistently tied the concept of symmetry to
judicial responsibilities in this area.
Nineteenth-century opinions
frequently referred to the “symmetry” of special pleading, drawing on
the holistic sense of symmetry to defend and justify legal fictions and
pleading requirements.130 As special pleading systems eroded, these
Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Justice Stevens’s dissent is discussed in Part
IV.E.2.).
128
See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 325 (1971)
(White, J.) (“[T]he application of res judicata in this case makes the law asymmetrical. But
the achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is the measure of the fairness
of the rules of res judicata.”).
129
A less common opposition presents symmetry as contrary to fairness. See, e.g., Dretke
v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This opposition is closely tied to
the presentation of symmetry as a cognitive distraction, discussed in Part IV.E.2.
130
See, e.g., Slater v. Emerson, 60 U.S. 224, 230 (1856) (argument of plaintiff)
(“[T]he . . . symmetry
of
pleading . . . requires . . . an
allegation
of
complete
performance . . . .”); Biggam v. Merritt, 1 Miss. 430 (1831) (referring to “fictions of
law . . . necessary to preserve the harmony and symmetry of its proceedings”); Shaw v.
Redmond, 1824 WL 2313, 11 Serg. & Rawle 27, at *7 (Pa. 1824) (referring to “an
excrescence . . . disfiguring the admirable symmetry of the law, and the just and beautiful
proportions of special pleading”).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 8

1192 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

writers persisted in linking symmetry to the judiciary’s role in ensuring
procedural fairness. In the mid- and late nineteenth century, opinion
writers used the concept to present legislative reforms as incursions on
the beauty of holistically symmetrical, judicially developed procedural
requirements131 or, under a statutory pleading system, to justify judicial
action in reforming pleadings.132
These approaches seem to have disappeared in the early twentieth
century. Eventually they were replaced by a different notion of judicial
management. Beginning around the early 1980s, opinion writers have
increasingly aligned the concept of symmetry with their role in
preserving the proper balance of risks, opportunities, and power
between the parties in a bilaterally symmetrical adversarial system.133
This reliance on the bilateral sense of symmetry in the civil procedure
context seems to have appeared around the same time as widespread use
of the bilateral schema to identify courts’ roles in several other areas, as
discussed below.134
Opinion writers have thus long appealed to symmetry as a positively
valued concept in connection with civil procedure, although this history
falls into two distinct phases. With increasing frequency, however,
writers are also resisting this linkage, aligning courts’ procedural
131
See, e.g., Butler v. Wentworth, 9 How. Pr. 282, 17 Barb. 649 (N.Y. Sup. 1854) (Clerke, J.,
dissenting) (referring to “the original system of pleading, before its symmetry was
disfigured by ill-considered legislation and judicial expedients”); O’Neal v. O’Neal, 1842
WL 4800, 4 Watts & Serg. 130 (Pa. 1842) (“[T]he symmetry of legal proceedings has yielded
in England to legislative measures of convenience; and, in our own state, much more
so . . . .”).
132
See, e.g., The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164, 168 (1870) (Bradley, J.) (“If a substitution of names
is necessary or proper it . . . can be made by the court under its general power to preserve
due symmetry in its forms of proceeding.”); Brickman v. S.C. R.R. Co., 8 S.C. 173 (1876)
(“[A]mendment after judgment is of the utmost importance . . . to give symmetry to the
system of pleading adopted by the Code.”).
133
See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 638 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“Without transient jurisdiction, an asymmetry would arise: A transient would have the
full benefit of the power of the forum State’s courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity
from their authority as a defendant.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982)
(Blackmun, J.) (“The disparity between the adversaries’ litigation resources is matched by a
striking asymmetry in their litigation options.”); Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 828 (7th
Cir. 1995) (noting that where “the plaintiffs would have a choice of venues but [the
defendant] would not, . . . there is no reason for such an asymmetry of procedural
choices”); Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 833 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“Symmetrical treatment should be given to the estimated lost earnings both before and
after trial so that neither party can benefit . . . .”); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 912
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[D]efending and plaintiffs’ counsel . . . should have compensation
of . . . the same amplitude. There is a logical symmetry in this principle.”).
134
See infra Parts IV.A.4-IV.A.5, IV.D.
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responsibilities with adjustments in the interests of asymmetrical
fairness.135 This countercurrent is especially visible in the context of civil
rights fee awards.136 The continued sway of the concept of symmetry in
this area is revealed by the form taken by statements of the need for
procedural asymmetry, which justify the apparent imbalance as a
mechanism for rectification of preexisting asymmetries in resources or
incentives. Like the approach taken by Flagg and Goldwasser, and like
other judicial approaches to fair asymmetry, these statements seem to
presuppose that symmetry is a measure of fairness, even if a certain
superficial symmetry is not fair in the case at hand.
Opinion writers have thus regularly used the concept of symmetry
to acknowledge the role of the judicial system in controlling the course of
civil litigation, but the nature of this acknowledgment has shifted.
Nineteenth-century writers were willing to describe themselves as the
calibrators of a judicially constructed system. Today, writers are more
likely to describe procedural decisions as technical adjustments in
response to a self-evident, easily reinstated binary balance. In this way,
opinion writers’ acknowledgment of their active involvement in making
procedural decisions has diminished.
4.

Symmetry in Criminal Procedure

Until well into the twentieth century, judicial opinions did not
commonly refer to symmetry or asymmetry in the criminal context.137
But the dialectic implicit in earlier references to justified asymmetry has
also recently emerged in this area, as opinion writers have come
consistently to refer to courts’ duty to safeguard mechanisms of
See, e.g., Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 1995) (urging “a balance between the
total advantages enjoyed by each side rather than an insistence on symmetry at every stage
in the process”).
136
See, e.g., Sanglap v. LaSalle Bank, 345 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Fee shifting under
the ADA, like other civil rights statutes, is asymmetric . . . .”); Monroe v. Children’s Home
Ass’n of Ill., 128 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Fee-shifting provisions in
the civil rights laws are asymmetric.”).
137
The earliest examples located in research for this project are State v. Morrison, 64 Ind.
141 (1878) (“This makes the criminal system . . . the more symmetrical.”); and State v.
Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1 (1886) (“The charge given was clear and symmetrical, and embraced the
law of all proper requests made by the defendant . . . .”). See also Edwards v. United States,
312 U.S. 473, 482 (1941) (“The refusal to permit the accused to prove his defense may prove
trivial . . . Procedural errors often are. But procedure is the skeleton which forms and
supports the whole structure of a case. The lack of a bone mars the symmetry of the
body.”); Johnson v. State, 198 Ark. 871 (1939) (“[I]t is more important that the law’s
symmetry be preserved than it is that a criminal be punished in a particular case.”). Similar
usages do not become numerically significant until after 1969.
135
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procedural asymmetry, usually to correct preexisting asymmetries of
power between prosecutors and criminal defendants. Often, opinions
trace this duty to the Constitution, rather than to the courts’ own
decision-making powers. In 1997, for instance, the Ninth Circuit noted
that the “asymmetr[ical],” defendant-focused guarantees of the Bill of
Rights “help[ ] explain why application of the rule of evidence
is . . . asymmetrical between defense and prosecution.”138
Opinions addressing the adjudication of criminal issues also
sometimes present a fair result in an individual case in opposition to
symmetry, in the sense of precise correspondence or regularity—a value
these writers nevertheless stop short of categorically rejecting.139 But this
approach, too, seems to have appeared later in the criminal context than
in other areas of law.
Given the long availability elsewhere of the concepts involved in
both approaches, it is not easy to explain the delay in their appearance in
the criminal context. If references to symmetry function both to describe
the judicial role and to signal judicial passivity, however, such references
could well seem out of place in the criminal context, where the coercive,
and hence active, face of the legal system is highly apparent. It may be
telling that the only sense of symmetry that appears in the criminal
context is the bilateral sense, which implies both action and its absence.
5.

Symmetry in Remedies

Courts are also highly active when they order and review remedies
in civil actions. In this area, more clearly than in the criminal context,
opinion writers have tended to use references to symmetry to articulate
courts’ passivity.
Early approaches presented particular remedies as necessary to
preserve or reinstate the holistic symmetry of equity or of legal

138
United States v. Paguio, 114 F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir. 1997); see also United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) (Marshall, J.) (“[P]ermitting review of all claimed legal
errors would have symmetry to recommend it . . . . But . . . the Double Jeopardy Clause
militate[s] against permitting the Government to appeal . . . .”); United States v. Harbin, 250
F.3d 532, 540 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Due process does not require absolute symmetry between
rights granted to the prosecution and those afforded the defense.”); United States v.
Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1980) (“A criminal prosecution . . . is in no sense a
symmetrical proceeding.”).
139
See, e.g., United States v. Shead, 568 F.2d 678, 684 (10th Cir. 1978) (“The Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses do not command symmetry within the probation and parole
systems.”); cf. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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doctrine.140 In the mid-nineteenth century, advocates and opinion
writers began to stress not just the comprehensive holism of the law, but
also consistency among remedies and correspondence between rights
and remedies.141 The focus in this slightly more active approach is on
matching remedial choices with their naturally corresponding rights or
with the remedies afforded others in corresponding situations.
This approach persists,142 but in the past two and a half decades
writers of judicial opinions have increasingly articulated conclusions
about appropriate remedies using references to bilateral reflective
symmetry. This trend is not confined to civil litigation,143 but it is
particularly common in civil cases, especially in those turning on the
fairness of remedies contracted for by the parties.144 In this context,
writers for courts are more likely to cast the courts as relatively passive
enforcers of remedies determined outside the legal system.

140
See Lee v. Lee, 9 Pa. 169 (1848) (stating that the appropriate “remedy [is] a new
trial . . . The symmetry of our system is thereby preserved”); Richards v. McDaniel, 9 S.C.L.
18, 1818 WL 731 (S.C. Const. App. 1818) (noting that under proposed construction, “the
mischief and the remedy may be more distinctly seen and applied, [establishing] a system
perfect in its symmetry”).
141
See, e.g., Clark v. Douglas, 62 Pa. 408 (1869) (“Nothing can be more just, consistent and
symmetrical than the system of administering the law here indicated; for . . . it gives a
remedy for every wrong . . . .”); Juvenal v. Patterson, 10 Pa. 282, 1849 WL 5609, at *2 (Pa.
1849) (Rogers, J.) (“[I]t is not easy to perceive why . . . [the plaintiff] is not entitled to a
remedy commensurate with her rights. This preserves the symmetry of the case . . . .”).
142
For examples of the correspondence and consistency approach, see, e.g., Linder v.
Berge, 567 F. Supp. 913, 917 (D.R.I. 1983) (Selya, J.) (describing the need to prevent
“engraft[ing] onto the law” “an inexplicable asymmetry between railroad workers and
other union members in the fashioning of remedies”); and Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, 981
P.2d 321, 326 (Okla. 1999) (referring to need to avoid “the pitfall of according asymmetrical
remedies to members of a single class of . . . victims”). For examples of the fair-asymmetry
approach, see United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that
“the lack of precise symmetry between actual damages . . . and the costs of mitigation or
the costs of the sanction, does not change the nature of the remedy”); and Kalman Floor Co.,
Inc. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc., 481 A.2d 553, 560 (N.J. Super. 1984) (noting “no reason why
justice should require perfect symmetry of remedy”).
143
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 763 (2005) (Breyer, J.); United States v.
Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of en
banc rehearing) (describing “the reason the remedial opinion in Booker made the Guidelines
advisory across the board” as a desire to avoid the “asymmetric” “alternative”).
144
See, e.g., McKinley Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 169, 187 n.9
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he Agreement [between the parties] . . . although not creating perfect
symmetry regarding remedies, does not leave McKinley defenseless.”); Goodwin v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 970 F. Supp. 1007, 1012 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (noting authority indicating that
“both sides may have to have symmetrical remedies in an adhesion contract, or it may be
found unconscionable”).
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An unusually nuanced analysis of bilaterally symmetrical remedial
relationships appears in the 2000 opinion of the California Supreme
Court in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services.145 Writing for
the court, Justice Mosk noted that parties are generally “free to contract
for asymmetrical remedies and arbitration clauses of varying scope”146
before holding that adhesion contracts containing unilateral arbitration
clauses are per se unconscionable. The Armendariz opinion devotes
much analysis to justification of the latter holding, which depended in
part on a judicial determination of the asymmetry in bargaining power
between the parties to the agreement in question.147 The space the
opinion devotes to this explanation makes sense in light of the fact that
the court’s holding was a significant departure from the background
presumption against which it was operating, expressed in the quotation
above: private individuals are generally responsible for engineering
their own bilateral relationships and determining the forums in which to
resolve their disputes. This presumption suggests that, in many cases,
adjudicators should not even take a first step toward analysis of the
fairness of agreements, as such fairness is ordinarily a matter of how the
bargain looks from the parties’ perspectives. An agreement that seems
bilaterally asymmetrical to outside parties may not seem unfair to the
parties to the agreement.
Armendariz is an exception proving the rule regarding the rhetoric of
judicial passivity. By presenting the court’s imposition of symmetry on
the contractual relationship as a deviation from the default rule, this
opinion shows how, even when opinion writers are at their most selfaware in acknowledging the contingency of perceptions of symmetry,
those writers describe the courts’ role as primarily passive.
6.

Symmetrical Treatment of Like Cases Alike

Perhaps the most prevalent link between symmetry and norms of
procedural fairness occurs across almost all types of litigation. This
approach, unlike many of those discussed above, draws primarily on the
sense of symmetry as precise correspondence, not holistic integration or
bilateral reflection, and aligns it with the like treatment of like cases.148
Although United States advocates and opinion writers have drawn this

24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000).
Id. at 118.
147
Id. at 115-21.
148
See WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 185-229; RAWLS, supra note 92, at
83-90.
145
146
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connection for more than two centuries, their manner of doing so has
changed.
Throughout the nineteenth century, judicial opinions made
summary references to symmetry as correlated with unelaborated
concepts of uniformity and consistency.149 This correlation implies some
sense of the like treatment of like cases, but, around the 1860s, advocates
and opinions increasingly began to make this implication—that
symmetrical treatment is the treatment of like cases alike and vice
versa—more explicit.150
Subsequent discussions have added new details to this approach.
Twentieth-century opinion writers, for instance, have linked symmetry
to a need for interjurisdictional doctrinal correspondence. An important
example is Justice Douglas’s opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, which
characterized Mapp as “an appropriate case in which to put an end to the
asymmetry which Wolf151 imported into the law.”152 (In Wolf, the Court
149
See, e.g., Barstow v. Adams, 2 Day 70 (Conn. 1805) (“[T]he construction put upon the
act . . . is . . . necessary to preserve the symmetry and uniformity of the system.”); Burnham
v. De Bevorse, 8 How. Pr. 159 (N.Y. 1853) (indicating that result would be compelled “as
long as legal proceedings retain any . . . consistency and symmetry”); Clark v. Douglass, 62
Pa. 408 (1869) (“Nothing can be more just, consistent and symmetrical than the system of
administering the law here indicated . . . .”); Irish v. Clayes, 10 Vt. 81 (1838) (referring to
“every rule of consistency and symmetry” as dictating holding in case); see also JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 444-45 (14th ed. 1896) (“Twenty-six independent
state courts of final jurisdiction over the same questions, arising upon the same general
code of common and of equity law, must necessarily impair the symmetry of that code.”).
150
See, e.g., Wood v. Truckee Turnpike Co., 24 Cal. 474 (1864) (“[S]ymmetry of decision
requires that the like rule should be applied in the case of turnpike corporations . . . .”);
Appeal of Roberts, 39 Pa. 417 (1861) (“[T]his general and just principle would be violated,
and the symmetry of our system would be marred, if parental succession, like all other
successions, were not made to conform to it . . . .”). The development of a sense of
symmetry as precise correspondence of applicable principles from case to case coincided
with the systematization and solidification of legal doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century.
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 253-66
(1977).
151
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding Fourth Amendment applicable to the
states, but declining to hold the exclusionary rule applicable against state officials in state
courts, even though the rule had applied in federal courts since the decision in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
152
367 U.S. 643, 670 (1960) (Douglas, J., concurring); see, e.g., Conetta v. Nat’l Hair Care
Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he applicable federal and state claims appear
to be wholly symmetrical . . . .”); In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 1982) (describing
case law as “reflect[ing] a concern that there be some symmetry between the bankruptcy
laws and state laws governing the definition of ‘property’”); Saffron v. Dep’t of the Navy,
561 F.2d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting the “symmetry between . . . courts which
Congress has endeavored to promote”). But see Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 224 (1996)
(Breyer, J.).
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had held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, but declined to make the exclusionary rule,
already available in federal court, applicable in state courts against state
actors.) Since the 1980s, opinion writers have also identified symmetryas-correspondence with stare decisis and precedential reasoning.153
Although it would seem difficult for an opinion writer to deny that
the responsibility for ensuring case-to-case consistency rests with the
courts themselves, all of the above approaches to the like treatment of
like cases also often obscure the courts’ active role in decision-making.
The identification of formal equality with the sense of symmetry as
precise correspondence purports to specify each concept, but it often
functions only to extend a halo of self-evident normative value around
both. The sense of symmetry as precise correspondence connotes the
type of lawlike regularity found in scientific disciplines and a form of
reproduction one step removed from human activity, although
ultimately traceable to human initiative.154 These conceptions convey
predictability, but the predictability depends in part on freedom from
immediate human interference. Identifying formal justice with this sense
of symmetry may represent another aspect of unwillingness to
acknowledge the work done by courts and opinion writers—in this
context, the choices they must make to draw parallels between cases.
B. Remaining Faithful to the Purposes of Lawmakers
The previous section focused on how legal rhetoric sometimes
spotlights the action of courts as the renderers of justice, and it suggested
that opinion writers have increasingly tended to obscure their own
decision-making agency in this connection. Denials of this type are not
always covert. This section discusses two long traditions of open denials
of judicial agency.

See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 219 (2000)
(“There is symmetry then in the holding here and in Rosenberger.”); In re Balfour MacLaine
Int’l Ltd., 85 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The situation is symmetrical to one where the all
risk insurer must prove there is no coverage of a loss . . . .”); Autotrol Corp. v. Cont’l. Water
Sys. Corp., 918 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The proper analysis of that case is
symmetrical with the proper analysis of our case.”); Zinser v. Cont’l Grain Co., 660 F.2d
754, 760 (10th Cir. 1981) (referring to Supreme Court’s reasoning in an earlier case as
“[e]xtending the rule of Hanover Shoe in what it believed to be a symmetrical fashion”).
154
See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
153
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Faithfulness to Legislatures

Congress itself has very rarely used the term “symmetry” in its
enactments.155 This fact may underscore the centrality of the concept of
symmetry to legal and judicial rhetoric and, particularly, to the acts of
self-justification not typically required of legislatures. Advocates and
opinion writers, in contrast, have long posited the achievement of
abstract symmetry as among a legislature’s chief purposes. Nineteenthcentury writers drew consistent parallels between symmetry and “the
obvious intent of the legislator.”156 These early references, like many of
those discussed in previous sections, are to the holistic sense of the term.
Twentieth-century opinion writers have continued to describe
legislative purposes by reference to a norm of symmetry, although the
sense implied has shifted toward that of precise correspondence and
away from that of holism.157 But in the twentieth century, opinion
writers asserting deference to legislatures have also often declared that
symmetry is not among a legislature’s usual or achievable goals, and

The only metaphorical references to symmetry or asymmetry in extant acts of
Congress are very recent invocations of “asymmetric threats.” In statutes setting forth the
reporting duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Defense Secretary, Congress
provided that these reports are to include a “description of the international threats posed
by terrorism . . . and asymmetric challenges to United States national security[,]” 10 U.S.C.
§ 153(d)(2)(D) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), and “the most
significant . . . capabilities . . . necessary for the armed forces to prevail against the most
dangerous threats, including asymmetrical threats, . . . to the national security interests of
the United States,” 10 U.S.C. § 486(c)(1) (Defense Secretary). The term also appears in
recent defense spending bills. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 108-375, div. A, tit. I, § 141, 118 Stat.
1829 (2004).
156
Carpenter v. Hoyt, 17 Ill. 529 (1856); see also King v. Fraser, 23 S.C. 543 (1885) (report of
special master) (referring to legislature’s efforts at “systematizing our . . . law” and court’s
duty “to sustain and promote this effort at symmetry”); Gibbons v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232
(1878) (noting that provisions, “though adopted on different days . . . were intended to
form parts of a symmetrical and harmonious whole”); Glamorgan Iron Co. v. Snyder, 84
Pa. 397 (1877) (noting that two “statutes are . . . to be construed as parts of a system
designed to be general and symmetrical”).
157
See, e.g., Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that a court is to “presume[ ] congressional intent to create a
‘symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme’” (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)) (“A court must therefore interpret the statute ‘as a
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme . . . .’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561 (1995)))); In re Newbury Café, Inc., 841 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1988) (“It is only
reasonable to assume that the drafters of the Code . . . would not, without good cause,
break up its symmetry.”); Sykes v. Tex. Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1987) (“We
cannot imagine that Congress actually intended such a perverse asymmetry . . . .”); United
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 350 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 1965) (“It is not forbidden judicial
legislation to give Congress credit for desiring symmetry.”).
155
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thus should not guide statutory interpretation.158 This approach is
clearly a variation on the opposition between practical reality and
abstract symmetry described above. In the statutory context, however,
opinion writers locate the need to deal with complex reality in the
legislature, rather than in the courts. Thus, this usage is not a means of
asserting judicial activity, but a statement of reasons for the denial of
such activity. It characterizes legislation as the unexaminable product of
a purely political process of accommodating interests and facts. In so
doing, it also implies the impossibility of meaningful judicial analysis of
legislation.
The consistency of rhetorical postures of passivity in the area of
statutory interpretation is hardly surprising. For related reasons,
opinion writers have assumed a similar posture in describing courts’
roles in conducting judicial review of the constitutionality of
legislation.159
2.

Faithfulness to the Purposes of the Makers of the Constitution

This discussion has already noted a few ways in which constitutional
adjudication has found asymmetry in the Constitution, particularly in its
guarantees of the rights of criminal defendants.160 This section focuses
on the ways constitutional adjudication has linked symmetry with the
conceptualization of separations of powers.
Even before judges began to interpret and apply the Constitution,
James Madison described the constitutional scheme of divided powers as
asymmetrical in two of the Federalist Papers. Madison’s approach to the
concept is unusually nuanced. In both essays, he recognizes that an
arrangement lacking apparent symmetry, in the holistic sense, may seem
intuitively wrong, but that the attribution of any such harmony to the
arrangement is ultimately a matter of perspective.161 Most judicial
158
See, e.g., Jankowski-Burczyk v. INS, 291 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Congress may
enact a regulatory measure . . . without a rationale for the resulting lack of symmetry.”);
United States v. McDowell, 117 F.3d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[S]ymmetry is not always
Congress’s paramount objective.”); Ind. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d 1275, 1282 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]his would not be the first time that
Congress has adjusted the competing positions of strong forces with a compromise of
imperfect symmetry.”); United States v. Shirah, 253 F.2d 798, 800 (4th Cir. 1958) (“[C]ourts
are not free to rewrite legislative enactments to give effect to the judges’ ideas of . . . the
desirability of symmetry in statutes.”).
159
See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 2.
160
See supra notes 123-24, 138-39 and accompanying text.
161
In Federalist No. 37, discussing “The Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a
Proper Form of Government,” Madison asked,
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references to the symmetry or asymmetry of the Constitution have been
more cursory than Madison’s.162 For instance, to support his argument
for federal Supreme Court review of state court judgments in Cohens v.
Virginia, Justice Marshall quoted the following appeal to the holistic
sense of symmetry from the Virginia legislature’s session records: “The
duties [that the Justices of the United States Supreme Court] have to
perform will lead them necessarily to the most enlarged and accurate
acquaintance with the jurisdiction of the federal, and several State
Courts, together with the admirable symmetry of our Government.”163
Opinion writers have continued to appeal to the symmetry of the
institutional structures created by the Constitution to support
conclusions regarding government power. In 1985, for instance, Chief
Judge Clark, writing for the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
referred to the “constitutional symmetry among the branches” of the
federal government in adjudicating the constitutionality of congressional
extension of bankruptcy judges’ terms in office.164 However, it is
difficult to find many recent examples of appeals to the symmetry or
asymmetry of the constitutional scheme that, like Justice Marshall’s,
foreground judicial power.165 In describing their relationship to the
structure of or established by the Constitution, opinion writers
increasingly obscure rather than foreground the activity of courts. In the
Would it be wonderful [i.e., surprising] if, under the pressure of all
these difficulties [inherent in constitutional engineering and the
negotiation of conflicting interests], the convention should have been
forced into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular
symmetry which an abstract view of the subject might lead an
ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet or
in his imagination?
FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison); see also FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); cf. JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 163, 1905 (1833).
162
See, e.g., Hunter v. Martin, 4 Munf. 1, 18 Va. 1 (1815) (supporting argument for
preclusion of federal Supreme Court review of state court judgments with statement that
proposed approach “will keep up and perfect the symmetry between this and every other
part of the constitution”).
163
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 358 n.23 (1821) (citing Extract from the Journal of the
Senate of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Richmond, Dec. 4, 1809).
164
Matter of Koerner, 800 F.2d 1358, 1367 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Stockton & Visalia R. Co.
v. Common Council of Stockton, 41 Cal. 147 (1871) (reasoning against conclusion that
would “permanently mar the symmetry of the structure of the Government itself”);
Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 354 (1883) (“The construction [suggested] . . . would
seem to indicate a fundamental fault . . . destructive of the symmetrical system devised by
the Constitution . . . .”); Att’y Gen. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425 (1874) (noting
“the symmetrical distribution of judicial powers in the constitution”).
165
But see State v. Hayne, 4 S.C. 403 (1873) (“If the Constitution should lose symmetry in
consequence of our judicial exposition of its terms, the responsibility would not rest on the
framers of that instrument.”).
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area of constitutional adjudication, perhaps more than in other areas, the
pressures driving this tendency have been well-examined.
Commentators often note the absence of a clear warrant for judicial
review166 and the frequent desirability of judicial passivity,167 or at least
minimalism,168 in constitutional adjudication. The next section addresses
two areas in which the virtues of passivity are less apparent and have
less frequently been defended by commentators.
C. Making Coherent Law
Opinion writers have long articulated the courts’ role as the
institutional guardian of the common law using references to symmetry
to characterize the doctrine to which judicial opinions contribute and are
ostensibly bound. An almost equally long tradition involves references
to symmetry in connection with recognition of the courts’ role as a
statutory interpreter, rather than a diviner of legislative intent. In both
areas, opinion writers consistently represent the courts’ role of ensuring
coherence in the relevant legal domain.169 But from the very beginning,
writers have also represented this role as one involving the restoration or
preservation of a prior legal coherence—that is, they have described the
role as largely passive.
1.

Statutory Coherence

In a tradition complementing that of legislative deference, advocates
and opinion writers have linked symmetry not to the creation of the
statutory scheme, but to the nature of the scheme itself.170 This approach
See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 2-15.
See generally id.; ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT
(1999); Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 85.
168
CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999).
169
This presentation is related to a powerful vein of jurisprudential commentary. See,
e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-224 (1988) (presenting theory of “law as
integrity,” under which “lawmakers . . . try to make the total set of laws morally coherent”
and “see[ the law] as coherent in that way”); Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U.
L. REV. 273 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949 (1988). Dan Simon approaches the norm of coherence from another
perspective, arguing that our inbuilt drive toward cognitive coherence is a significant
constraint on legal decision-making. See works cited supra note 55.
170
This link may involve focus on statutory text, but need not do so. Courts also
attribute symmetry to abstract conceptual relationships within a statutory scheme. See, e.g.,
Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 538, 540 (1978) (majority op. and op. of Powell, J.,
dissenting) (noting “the logical symmetry between the gain recognized at the shareholder
level and the dividend credit allowed at the corporate level” and preference for “a
166
167
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is best understood as a variation on the posture of deference to the
legislature’s will, even though it does not expressly posit such a will.
In one version of this approach, writers present symmetry and
coherence as identical, immanent in the statutory scheme, and indicative
of other positive norms. The norm most often linked to symmetry and
coherence in this way is consistency or logical noncontradiction.171 In the
early and mid-nineteenth century, advocates and judges often aligned
symmetry and coherence with uniformity, an even more holistic
concept.172 Recently, opinion writers seem to have begun to use
“symmetry” to refer to coherence arising from structural parallelism, or
correspondence, between individual statutory provisions.173
Opinion writers do not always identify the statutory scheme with
symmetry. References to the necessary asymmetry of statutes first
emerged around the turn of the twentieth century, roughly when the
opposition between practical justice and theoretical symmetry also

resolution that advanced the symmetry of the relevant Code provisions”). In another
tradition, courts invoke statutory symmetry as an indication of legislative intent. The idea
is not that the legislature intended symmetry as such, but that the symmetry of the scheme
indicates something about a more specific legislative purpose. See, e.g., United States v.
Chavarria-Herrara, 15 F.3d 1033, 1035 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The symmetrical structure of §
3742 indicates that Congress intended appellate review of sentences to be available to the
government . . . . The legislative history confirms this symmetry.”); United States v. Kurka,
818 F.2d 1427, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (“An examination of the symmetry of section 33
makes it apparent that the Govenrment’s interpretation was not the intended construction
of the statute.”); ICC v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 334 F.2d 46, 50 (5th Cir. 1964)
(“Symmetry . . . suggests a congressional purpose to allow [the construction
reached] . . . .”); State ex rel. Carson v. Harrison, 16 N.E. 384, 388 (Ind. 1888) (“[T]he term is
not only etymologically correct, but it renders the several provisions of the constitution . . .
symmetrical . . . and effectuates the evident intention of its authors.”).
171
See, e.g., Missouri. v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270, 289 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986) (Bright, J.,
dissenting) (“This explanation . . . gives the Act internal symmetry and consistency . . . .”);
Davis v. U.S. Lines Co., 253 F.2d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 1958) (rejecting interpretation of statute
that would “rob the statute of symmetry and logic”); Bishop v. Sanford, 15 Ga. 1 (1854)
(noting need “to harmonize [statutory provisions], if it be possible, to . . . maintain a
symmetrical system of legislation, if it can be done”); Sasportas v. De La Motta, 31 S.C. Eq.
38 (S.C. App. Eq. 1858) (“All of these Acts being in pari materia should be construed . . . so
as to form a symmetrical and rational system.”).
172
See, e.g., Barstow v. Adams, 2 Day 70 (Conn. 1805) (This “construction . . . is necessary
to preserve the symmetry and uniformity of the system.”); Comm’r v. Wyman, 49 Mass.
247 (1844) (“[The law revision commissioners] were occasionally deficient in giving that
symmetrical form to the laws which would have been desirable . . . .”).
173
See, e.g., United States v. Shi, 317 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The prohibition of
possessing . . . these phony documents is symmetrical with the prohibition of possessing
and selling illegal drugs . . . .”).
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emerged in other areas.174 Such references have become increasingly
common since the mid-twentieth century, when opinion writers also
began to articulate the notion that legislatures do not necessarily intend a
symmetrical statutory scheme.175 Although they reject symmetry, these
approaches usually involve appeals to coherence, or even
correspondence in some sense. Thus, a writer may explain statutory
asymmetry by reference to the complexity of reality, which makes the
perception of coherence, or of the correspondence between law and fact,
a matter of perspective and an activity committed to the legislature.176
More recently, writers have explained statutory asymmetry simply by
noting that justifications for legislative action, unlike those for judicial
action, need not be declared or self-evident.177
As these examples indicate, here, as in other areas, opinion writers
have shied away from acknowledging either the active decision-making
involved in the identification of symmetrical relationships or the active
decision-making involved in the judicial tasks in the service of which
that perception occurs.178 Although a few nineteenth-century opinions
refer to a court’s creation or restoration of symmetrical coherence to the

174
See, e.g., In re H.B. Claflin Co., 52 F. 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1892) (“[T]he court cannot attempt
to adjust into symmetry the various provisions of a statute . . . .”); see also Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 248 (1961) (“The legislative process of the post-bellum Congresses . . . was one
of struggle and compromise . . . This was not an endeavor for achieving legislative patterns
of analytically satisfying symmetry.”); Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[S]tatutory symmetry is preferable but not required.”); Sec. Bank S.S.B. &
Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 116 F.3d 302, 305 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[Congress’s] intent was clearly
to recognize the economic realities of the situation for the taxpayer rather than an abstract
principle of symmetry.”).
175
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
176
See, e.g., Sec. Bank S.S.B. & Subsidiaries, 116 F.3d at 305; Ind. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v.
Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d 1275, 1282 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]his would not
be the first time that Congress has adjusted the competing positions of strong forces with a
compromise of imperfect symmetry.”); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(“Congress was not obliged to regulate such demonstrations for the sake of
symmetry. . . .”); In re Permanent Surface Min. Reg. Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 522-23 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (“From such a process of compromise and adjustment, a symmetrical statute . . . is
unlikely to emerge.”).
177
See, e.g., United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A]lthough
[the] . . . scheme is asymmetrical, Congress is not required to think like a lawyer, and we
are not empowered to impose on clear statutory language our own notions of symmetry.”);
Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Congress was not obliged to regulate
such demonstrations for the sake of symmetry . . . .”); United States v. Le Boeuf Bros.
Towing Co., 537 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[C]ongressional schemes need not seem to
courts symmetrical [or] consistent . . . to be valid.”).
178
But see Comm’r. v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 304 (1961) (discussed infra note 181).
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statutory scheme,179 even during that period advocates and judges
primarily described coherence as present in the scheme before any
judicial activity took place. Thus, a court’s role has long been described
as that of preserving180 the symmetry of the scheme.181 One longstanding
approach has been to reject a proposed interpretation on the basis that it
would mar the already existing symmetry of the scheme.182 This posture
of detachment from the statutory scheme is a variation on the posture of
legislative deference, but it is not quite the same. Advocates and opinion
writers usually refer to attributes of the statutory scheme itself when
179
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Coxe, 4 U.S. 170, 203 (1800) (Yeates, J.) (“The construction I
have adopted, appears to me to restore perfect symmetry to the whole act, and to preserve
its due proportions.”); Std. Underground Cable Co. v. Att’y Gen., 19 A. 733 (N.J. Err. &
App. 1890) (“Under the construction which we give to this law, it will fall symmetrically
into our system of . . . taxation.”).
180
See, e.g., The Star, 16 U.S. 78, 92 (1818) (“In considering the section in question as
merely affirmative, . . . the symmetry of a system apparently built up with great care and
caution . . . is maintained and enforced.”); United States v. Arishi, 54 F.3d 596, 597 (9th Cir.
1995) (“[T]he symmetry between Rule 35(b) motions and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motions is
maintained.”); Ochoa v. Employers Nat’l Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing
precedent that “persuades us to maintain the symmetry of the Act”); Hills v. Comm’r., 691
F.2d 997, 1006 (11th Cir. 1982) (under the interpretation adopted, “[s]ymmetry is
preserved.”); Field v. City of Boston, 64 Mass. 65 (1852) (“Thus the symmetry of the law of
taxation is preserved.”); Macoy v. Curtis, 14 S.C. 367 (1880) (“Such is the meaning of the
whole provision taken together, and its enforcement is necessary to preserve order and
symmetry.”).
181
This tradition is especially pronounced in interpretations of the Internal Revenue
Code. See, e.g., United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S. 232, 236 (1955). “We
can only take the Code as we find it and give it as great an internal symmetry and
consistency as its words permit.” Id. Interestingly, and contrary to the trends traced
throughout most of this study, the Court later transformed this rule, which originally
stressed the court’s passivity, into a command to courts to impose symmetry on the code to
help it to attain the intended coherence. See Lester, 366 U.S. at 304. “[T]he Code must be
given ‘as great an internal symmetry and consistency as its words permit.’” Id. (citing
Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S. at 236) (emphasis added).
182
See, e.g., Hiller Cranberry Prods., Inc. v. Koplovsky, 165 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1999)
(Selya, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority . . . disrupts the symmetry of the statutory scheme.”);
Sharp Microelectronics Tech., Inc. v. United States, 122 F.3d 1446, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“We thus can identify a symmetry in the [statute] . . . . We think that symmetry is
dislodged and its components discounted too much by [the] argument . . . .”); Richey
Manor, Inc. v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 130, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rejecting construction that
would “destroy the symmetry of the regulatory scheme”); Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates &
Pilots, Marine Div., Intern Longshore Men’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 554, 560
(5th Cir. 1976) (noting that party’s “argument, if allowed to prevail, would destroy the
symmetry . . . embodied in [the statute]”); United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 646 (2d
Cir. 1952) (rejecting “alteration in the statutory scheme . . . that destroys its symmetry”);
Carpenter v. Hoyt, 17 Ill. 529 (1856) (“We should destroy the symmetry, mar the design,
and defeat the obvious intent of the legislator, in any other interpretation.”); State v.
Sturgess, 9 Or. 537 (1881) (“[I]t is quite apparent that if the [statute] last enacted should be
held
[to
have
the
meaning
proposed],
a
conflict . . . would
be
developed; . . . symmetry . . . lost, inconsistencies and incompatibilities introduced . . . .”).
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legislative intention is obscure or off-limits as material for justification.
In such a situation, the activity and power of a court are potentially at
their height. Yet, as described, most references to symmetry function to
veil this activity and power.
It is not immediately clear how this rhetoric of detachment applies to
the context of a court’s common-law role, as it would seem difficult to
describe the common law as created by anything other than courts. The
next section explores legal writers’ responses to this difficulty.
2.

Doctrinal Coherence and the Edifice of the Law

References to symmetry in descriptions of the coherence of legal
doctrine have been more complex than references to the concept in
connection with statutory coherence. As in the statutory context, legal
writers have consistently referred to the body of common law and
constitutional legal doctrine as self-evidently symmetrical, and they have
also referred to it as justifiably asymmetrical. But in references to legal
doctrine as symmetrical, writers have also added another approach: a
pervasive figure of speech that first metaphorically transforms the body
of doctrine into an architectural structure and then attributes
symmetrical properties to it. This device permits legal writers to
maintain the descriptive distance from the courts’ own efforts and the
disavowal of interference that usually seems to accompany references to
symmetry in legal writing, while also acknowledging the created nature
of the law.
The approach appears as early as the first chapter of Blackstone’s
Commentaries:
The mischiefs that have arisen to the public from
inconsiderate alterations of our laws [through
legislation], are too obvious to be called in
question . . . . The common law of England has fared like
other venerable edifices of antiquity, which rash and
inexperienced workmen have ventured to new-dress
and refine, with all the rage of modern improvement.
Hence frequently its symmetry has been destroyed, its
proportions distorted, and its majestic simplicity
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exchanged for specious embellishments and fantastic
novelties.183
Many American judges have taken up Blackstone’s image.184 The
preeminent United States example of the metaphor is probably Justice
Cardozo’s 1937 statement in Palko v. Connecticut.185 To cap his argument
that no constitutional guarantees were violated by a state statute
permitting the retrial for a capital crime of a defendant already convicted
of a noncapital crime based on the same offense, Justice Cardozo stated
that the statute did no damage to constitutional doctrine, but rather lent
reciprocal, or bilateral, symmetry to the law:
If the trial had been infected with error adverse to the
accused, there might have been review at his instance,
and as often as necessary to purge the vicious taint. A
reciprocal privilege, subject at all times to the discretion
of the presiding judge, has now been granted to the
state. There is here no seismic innovation. The edifice of
justice stands, its symmetry, to many, greater than
before.186
Justice Cardozo’s articulation, unlike Blackstone’s, describes
constitutional doctrine and statutory law as a seamless whole. It also
illustrates the trend toward a more concrete conception of bilateral
symmetry and away from references to lawmaking in terms of activity.
But Justice Cardozo’s approach echoes Blackstone’s in identifying the
“edifice of justice” as something basically created by a body other than
the court deciding the dispute in question.187

183
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-69), § 1, ¶14
(Introduction) (On the Study of Law). On the significance of Blackstone’s Commentaries to
American law, see LAWRENCE W. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 59-60, 467-68
(3d ed. 2005); WOOD, supra note 14, at 10, 264, 350.
184
For a recent example, see NLRB v. Acme Die Casting Corp., 728 F.2d 959, 963 (7th Cir.
1984) (Reported cases “do not form an edifice of perfect symmetry.”). In addition to the
cases cited infra notes 192, 193, 195, 199, see Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 589 (1819) (“[I]f we
were to take up the decisions of all the states founded as they are upon local customs,
colonial necessities, and legislative innovations, and . . . make them the rule of adjudication
here, we should . . . disfigure and break down the ancient temple of justice.”).
185
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
186
Id. (internal citations omitted). For a discussion of Cardozo’s approaches to use of the
concept of symmetry in legal discourse, see Laurence, supra note 90, at 876 n.53, and
discussion infra note 276.
187
Palko, 302 U.S. at 328.
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The power of the edifice metaphor is surely due partly to its
versatility. It links a holistic conception of symmetry to an array of
otherwise unrelated norms: comprehensiveness, aesthetic harmony,
tradition, stability, and impersonality, as well as social cohesion, implied
by the fact that “edifices” can be created only by the organized work of
many people. Despite this versatility, around the end of the nineteenth
century, opinion writers sometimes declined to invoke it in linking
symmetry to doctrinal coherence. Instead, they began to link both
doctrinal coherence and symmetry to a norm that is less easy to
accommodate within the edifice-of-the-law metaphor—efficiency.188
Around the same time, and consistently with the development noted
repeatedly above, opinion writers also began to use the opposition
between practical reality and theoretical symmetry to justify conclusions
sustaining or introducing apparent asymmetries, or anomalies, within
legal doctrine.189 This approach became widespread by the second half
of the twentieth century. But like the analogous trends discussed in
previous sections, it did not involve the rejection of symmetry as a norm,
as the approach presumes a need to justify apparently asymmetrical
doctrinal structures. And alongside this approach, opinion writers have
continued to align the edifice-of-the-law metaphor and other references
to symmetry directly with doctrinal coherence.190 Judges and justices

188
See Workman v. City of New York, 179 U.S. 552, 559 (1900) (noting the “evil springing
from” “[t]he disappearance of all symmetry in the maritime law”); Hardie v. Swafford
Bros. Dry Goods Co., 165 F. 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1908) (“[W]e are disposed to deny that
in . . . bankruptcy law the discharge of the honest debtor . . . could have been omitted
without impairing [the law’s] symmetry and efficiency . . . .”).
189
See, e.g., Tyler v. Tomkinson, 414 F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[T]his field of the law
continues to defy symmetry.”); Jordahl v. Berry, 75 N.W. 10 (Minn. 1898) (“[I]t is more
important to work practical justice than to preserve the logical symmetry of a rule . . . .”).
Similar usages did preexist the late nineteenth century. See United States v. Forness, 125
F.2d 928, 937 n.28 (2d Cir. 1942) (noting Henry Maine’s criticism, in Ancient Law (1861), of
the notion that “‘somewhere . . . there existed a complete, coherent, symmetrical body of
English law . . . furnish[ing] principles [applicable] to any . . . combination of
circumstances’”); Richardson v. Daggett, 4 Vt. 336 (1832) (“[T]here is not in the law on this
subject, that perfect symmetry . . . which might be desired. The difficulty is probably
inherent in the subject.”).
190
See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader, J., concurring) (“Like the proverbial balloon, a pinch on this
backside of the law disrupts symmetry on the front side.”); Wigginton v. Centracchio, 205
F.3d 504, 511 n.9 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that court’s earlier “broadening of [a principle
drawn from an earlier case] was required . . . to maintain doctrinal symmetry”); Waddle v.
Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. 1992) (“[A]pplying the same standard . . . promotes a
symmetry desirable in this area of the law.”).
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sometimes even cite doctrinal symmetry as the sole justification for a
result, without linking it to any other value.191
In a related tradition that also first emerged in the second half of the
nineteenth century, advocates and opinion writers began to refer to
symmetry in descriptions not of doctrine, but of the judicial system
considered institutionally.192 This usage sometimes borrowed the edifice
metaphor and also sometimes, as in Palko, seemed to identify doctrine
and institution as parts of the same edifice.193 This focus on the holistic
integrity of the judicial system has now largely given way to linkages of
institutional symmetry with transjurisdictional correspondence and
parallelism.194
As in all of the areas discussed above, when discussing doctrinal
coherence, opinion writers commonly cast themselves and courts, in a
passive role. To be sure, these writers have sometimes acknowledged
the fact that doctrine is the product of judicial action195 and, less often,
191
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 638 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“Without transient jurisdiction, an asymmetry would arise: A transient would have the
full benefit of the power of the State’s courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity from
their authority as a defendant.”).
192
See Coombs v. State, 47 S.W. 163, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) (“[U]nique in outline,
perfect in symmetry, . . . this magnificent temple of justice, builded by the framers of our
constitution, is well fitted to . . . grapple with all the demands of litigation.”); see also New
England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 23 (1870) (“The admiralty
courts . . . deriv[ed] . . . much of [their] completeness and symmetry . . . from the civil
law.”); In re Wyllie, 2 Hughes 449, 30 F.Cas. 733 (W.D. Va. 1872) (declining invitation to
“mar the symmetry . . . of that wisely constructed system of courts for administering the
law of both governments”); Persons v. Hight, 4 Ga. 474 (1848) (Nisbet, J., concurring)
(“Nothing is more painful to me, than this marring of the beauty of the law—this
destruction of its symmetry and order . . . .”).
193
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). For other examples in which it is
difficult to distinguish doctrine from institution, see Commonwealth v. Chapman, 54 Mass. 68
(1847); Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 589 (N.J. 1819), cited supra note 184.
194
See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 285 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In
achieving statewide symmetry among civil rights claims the Court creates fresh problems
of asymmetry that are of far greater moment . . . .”); Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los
Angeles, 316 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting “symmetry” between California and
federal antidiscrimination statutes); Shepherd v. Comm’r., 147 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Posner, J.) (referring to “the symmetry that we have stressed throughout this opinion
between the Tax Court in deficiency cases and the district courts in refund cases”); Forsyth
v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is some symmetry between
RICO’s private right of action and Nevada’s administrative scheme.”); Saffron v. Dep’t of
the Navy, 561 F.2d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (referring to “the symmetry between the [Court
of Claims and the district courts] which Congress has endeavored to promote”).
195
See, e.g., Ex parte Andrews, 40 Ala. 639 (1867) (Byrd, J.) (“The integrity, learning,
patriotism, and legal and judicial opinions of [Story, Hamilton, Kent, and Marshall] are the
solid, massive, polished, and enduring pillars, upon which reposes the vast superstructure
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their own role in its construction.196 But usually they use devices such as
the edifice metaphor to obscure their agency. The metaphor most often
identifies the symmetrical edifice of doctrine as something perfected
before the adjudicator comes on the scene. By distinguishing doctrine
from their own actions in this way, opinion writers easily represent their
relationship to doctrine as a matter of relatively passive preservation197
or restoration198 of the symmetry of the edifice. Thus, opinion writers
have commonly used the metaphor to justify a refusal to act, on the basis
that any action would deface the edifice.199
of American . . . jurisprudence; and whatever beauty of expression, symmetry of
proportion, unity of construction, and solidity of texture, are to be found in the splendid
fabric, may be traced to [their] labors . . . .”); Dehon v. Foster, 86 Mass. 545, 555 (1862)
(referring to “perfect[ion]” of “‘English equity into a symmetrical science’”); cf. Hughes v.
Anderson, 68 Ala. 280 (1880) (“The rough outline of natural right, or natural liberty, must
submit to the chisel of the mason, that it may enter symmetrically into the social
structure.”); Schall v. Williams Valley R. Co., 35 Pa. 191 (1860) (quoting district court
opinion referring approvingly to “a symmetrical system of principles and rules, built up by
the labours of the learned through a series of ages”).
196
See, e.g., Ward v. Studebaker Sales Corp. of Am., 113 F.2d 567, 569 (3d Cir. 1940)
(referring to “the difficult effort to preserve juristic symmetry and at the same time not
disturb stare decisis”).
197
See, e.g., Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 535 (3d Cir.
1998) (“[T]he need to preserve symmetry between the treatment of general and special
verdicts would . . . be denigrated, by a finding of waiver . . . .”); Butler v. Local Union 823,
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, 514 F.2d 442, 450 (5th Cir.
1975) (“[T]he rule [proposed] preserves the symmetry . . . necessary to the furtherance of
federal labor policy . . . .”); Ward v. Studebaker Sales Corp. of Am., 113 F.2d 567, 569 (3d.
Cir. 1940); Howland v. Doyle, 5 R.I. 33 (1857) (“Except to preserve the symmetry of the
common-law system, it is . . . of little practical importance whether a warranty . . . be
implied . . . .”); Joslyn v. Smith, 13 Vt. 353 (1841) (argument of plaintiff) (“This doctrine is
necessary to preserve the symmetry of the law, (which ought not to be departed from but
from necessity or by statute).”).
198
See, e.g., United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e restore
symmetry and consistency to our law.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52, 56 (5th
Cir. 1961) (“[The position taken in previous cases] has more than restored symmetry
within . . . this Circuit.”); Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 553-54
(Tex. App.), rev’d in part, 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985) (“The time has come to . . . restore
equity and symmetry to this area of the law . . . .”); cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670
(1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]his is an appropriate case in which to put an end to the
asymmetry which Wolf imported into the law.”).
199
See, e.g., Reeves v. Petty & Goodner, 44 Tex. 249 (1875) (“When we reflect that those
who sat in judgment in these cases were men who . . . drew up, gave shape to, and aided in
the passage of many of our laws, we may not wonder that those of us who
follow . . . dislike to see the symmetry of the temple defaced or marred.”); see also Peterson
v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1259 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting conclusion that would “destroy
the rationality and symmetry the Supreme Court has finally brought to the law”); United
States v. Fleming, 115 F.2d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 1940) (noting that proposed result “encroaches
on and to that extent impairs, the symmetry of the rule of comparative negligence broadly
applied”); Haynes v. Nowlin, 29 N.E. 389, 390 (Ind. 1891) (“The decisions which
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Both the description of doctrinal symmetry as a matter of efficiency
and references to justified asymmetry commonly accompany a rhetoric
of judicial passivity. The focus on efficiency achieves this by stressing
not court-generated doctrine, but its real-world consequences, and
implying a norm of minimal activity. The justified-asymmetry approach
achieves a similar end by stressing the correspondence of the preferred
result with the complexity of reality or with intuited, rather than
theoretical or logically derived, justice.
Thus, opinion writers’ references to symmetry in articulating the
roles of courts in shaping doctrine and interpreting statutes do resemble
the approaches discussed in previous sections. Regardless of whether
these writers posit symmetry or asymmetry as components of
lawmakers’ intent or as features of the law itself, the writers usually
locate the origin of that symmetry or asymmetry elsewhere than in the
courts. Increasingly, in as many ways as possible, opinion writers avoid
direct acknowledgment of their own role in the attribution of symmetry
or asymmetry to the problem before them or to the law they create and
apply. In the past three decades, opinion writers have developed a new
rhetorical device for achieving a similar end, addressed in the next
section.
D. Correcting for Market Imperfections
The increasingly popular approaches discussed in this section are
much more uniform than those discussed in previous sections. In
describing the judicial system’s role of correcting for imperfections in
various markets, opinion writers invariably mobilize a very pure form of
the bilateral conception of symmetry.
Although the notion of bilateral reciprocity has clear applicability to
common-law contract doctrine,200 and although the sense of symmetry to
mean a specifically bilateral abstract relationship was certainly in wide
use by the mid-nineteenth century,201 explicit linkages of concepts of
symmetry and asymmetry with bilateral bargaining and competitive

denied . . . a right of action broke the line of consistency and marred the symmetry of the
law.”).
200
See, e.g., Pine R. State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983) (“The
demand for mutuality of obligation, although appealing in its symmetry, is simply a
species of the forbidden inquiry into the adequacy of consideration . . . .”); Jeffrey L.
Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 573 (1983) (“Contract law is
characterized by a comforting symmetry.”).
201
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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relationships are rare before the 1980s.202 (This timing could be taken as
a sign of the influence on legal reasoning and rhetoric of economic
analysis, which seem to have begun to draw heavily on the bilateral
conception of symmetry in the 1950s and ‘60s,203 and the subsequent
development of law and economics scholarship.204) The explicit judicial
references to the concept that began to appear in the 1980s link the
corrective role played by courts to, among other things, asymmetries in
risk,205 bargaining power,206 opportunity,207 and information.208

202
Courts have long referred to the “symmetry” of contracts but earlier used the term in
its holistic sense. Many early twentieth-century opinions address the severability of
contract clauses as a question of whether excision of a clause would affect the symmetry of
the contract as a whole. The rule using this language may have originated in Newport
Rolling Hill Co. v. Hall, 144 S.W. 760 (Ky. App. 1912): “The general rule is that where
obnoxious feature of a contract can be avoided without impairing its symmetry as a whole,
the courts will be most likely to adopt this view . . . .” Id. at 762-63. An unusual early
opinion connecting symmetry to bilaterality in the contract context is Harris v. Indep. Gas
Co., 92 P. 1123 (Kan. 1907): “[A] system which attempts . . . to insure to [a contracting party]
the actual fruits of his bargain, ought, for the sake of completeness and symmetry, to enable
him to insist upon the performance even of a purely executory contract.” Id. at 1124. One
early reference to symmetry to describe the relative power of parties to a bargain is really
an instance of the precise-correspondence sense of symmetry. See S.D. Warren Co. v.
NLRB, 353 F.2d 494, 500 (1st Cir. 1965) (referring to need to a void result that might “mar
the symmetry of plant-wide [collective] bargaining”). In a similar early example, the
Fourth Circuit noted, “While symmetry of application and predictability . . . are
[important], . . . [w]hat is symmetrical is a complex question. . . . [T]he search for symmetry
here is rendered even less manageable by the complex exchange relationship created by
these contracts.” Bear Brands Hosiery Co. v. Tights, Inc., 605 F.2d 723, 726-27 (4th Cir.
1979).
203
See supra note 89.
204
Cf. Eric M. Fink, Post-Realism, or the Jurisprudential Logic of Late Capitalism: A Socio-Legal
Analysis of the Rise and Diffusion of Law and Economics, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 951-63 (2004)
(concluding that diffusion of the law and economics approach into judicial decisionmaking has been mild, based on analysis of frequency of citation to law and economics
scholarship in judicial opinions); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An
Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) (discussing “deep capture” of legal and political discourse by
economic modes of thought).
205
See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 948 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting “asymmetry of
control of risk-reduction measures between health-care workers and patients”); Jason’s
Foods, Inc. v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214, 218 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) (noting
“argument for regarding the parties’ positions as symmetrical from the standpoint of
ability either to prevent or to shift losses”).
206
See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 118 (Cal.
2000) (discussed supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50
F.3d 1041, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (“Under our rule, the symmetry and
mutuality of the bargaining process are preserved.”).
207
See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 827 (1996) (“[P]ermit[ting an] absent
party to pursue [certain remedies] . . . prevent[s] him from exploiting the asymmetries he
creates by participating in one suit but not the other.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
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These references share many features. Virtually all imply that an
asymmetry of any of these types is inherently undesirable and selfevidently calls for correction. The opposition between practical reality
and theoretical symmetry, noted in most of the areas discussed above, is
thus rare in this context.209 Identifications of market asymmetry also
present the correction of such asymmetries as the obviously proper task
of the legal system. But almost as often as they assign this task to the
courts, as in Armendariz,210 opinion writers assign the corrective role to
other institutions—legislatures211 or administrative agencies and
executive officers.212 Even when a writer acknowledges the courts’ active
role in resolving a dispute, the writer can also present the opinion’s
effects as merely the modest restoration of a natural balance by making
the correction of market asymmetries the justification for a conclusion.213
764 (1981) (“The disparity between the adversaries’ litigation resources is matched by a
striking asymmetry in their litigation options.”).
208
Examples of this usage are especially numerous. Recent instances include, e.g., AT&T
Commc’ns. of Cal., Inc. v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 375 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2004) (justifying
conclusion in part by reference to local telephone providers’ “asymmetric access to cost
data”); and Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 238 F.3d 124, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[I]n applying a similar burden shift to other sections of the Act, the FCC has considered
information asymmetry.”).
209
But see Pabst Brewing Co., Inc. v. Corrao, 161 F.3d 434, 443 (7th Cir. 1998) (Ripple, J.,
dissenting) (“Labor contracts . . . rarely reflect the pristine symmetry of the textbook
contract.”).
210
See supra Section IV.A.5; see, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 827 (1996)
(discussing how “permit[ting an] absent party to pursue [certain remedies] . . . prevent[s]
him from exploiting the asymmetries he creates by participating in one suit but not the
other”); Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1319 n.14 (7th Cir. 1983)
(“As a result of this asymmetry of information, some courts have imposed upon
manufacturers a continuing duty to warn of defects . . . .”); Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 118 (Cal. 2000) (linking asymmetry in contractual
clauses and bargaining power to contract law doctrine of unconscionability).
211
See, e.g., Cornist v. B.J.T. Auto Sales, Inc., 272 F.3d 322, 330 n.4 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
interpretation of Truth in Lending Act that would result in “credit customers [being]
asymmetrically advantaged in bargaining over price”); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d
1041, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (referring to “the symmetry, mutuality,
and balance of the collective bargaining process as crafted by Congress over the past 60
years”); Ruefenacht v. O’Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 336 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing “state law
that did not . . . admit of asymmetries between buyer and seller”).
212
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 208; see also Davin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043,
1050 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993)
(same); Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that
regulation “presented some symmetry between PEG access, leased access, and commercial
channels”); King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Affidavits
submitted by a governmental agency . . . must . . . strive to correct . . . the asymmetrical
distribution of knowledge that characterizes FOIA litigation.”).
213
Cf. E.E.O.C. v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1543 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “the delicate contractual balances created by sophisticated financial
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Contributing to this effect is the exclusive reliance of this approach
on the bilateral conception of symmetry. As noted above, this schema
implies a modicum of analysis and is also virtually always presented as
involving comprehensive assessment of all possibilities.214 Because of
the salience of this schema and our apparent tendency to perceive it as
natural, references to it almost never involve acknowledgment of the
contingency of perceptions of symmetry, making it the ideal vehicle for a
rhetoric of passivity.
In this area, too, references to symmetry function to obscure judicial
activity. The same is largely true of the approaches discussed in the next
section.
E. Justifying Conclusions
This survey concludes by examining the ambivalent uses legal
writers have made of the concept of symmetry in relation to the reasoned
justification of legal conclusions. It is in this area that judicial opinion
writers most self-consciously address the work they perform.215 But in
this context, as in those discussed above, these writers have tended to
use the concept of symmetry as a kind of shorthand. Even when they
come closest to discussing the activity they are performing, they
generally avoid addressing it directly or describing it as activity.
1.

Symmetry and Logic

United States opinion writers have consistently drawn both positive
and negative connections between symmetry and logic. Most of the
positive approaches fall into two overlapping categories. In the first,
writers simply link logic and symmetry grammatically. In the second,
these opinion writers, like some of the commentators discussed in Part
III, use the concept of symmetry as an organizational and reasoning tool,
an indicator of the route to a sound conclusion.

professionals [can] become distorted by . . . asymmetries, and unsettled expectations”);
Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversing decision
on ground that result “creates an odd asymmetry” in market power).
214
See discussion supra notes 21, 62-70 and accompanying text.
215
Although legal rhetoric is the public manifestation of legal reasoning, the cognitive
process by which judges arrive at their conclusions should be distinguished from the
process of reasoned presentation of conclusions. See Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial
Decision Making, supra note 55; Wetlaufer, supra note 2. But see Wald, supra note 2, at 1375
(“It is not so unusual [for a judge writing an opinion] to modulate, transfer, or even switch
an originally intended rationale or result in midstream because ‘it just won’t write.’”).
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One form of the first approach, particularly prevalent in, but not
restricted to, the nineteenth century involves the assertion of identity
between “logic” or “reason” and symmetry.216 Another variant makes
the concepts into attributes of one another by appealing to “logical
symmetry.”217 This approach presents symmetry as a feature of logic
and vice versa. Judge Cardozo’s discussion of “the method of analogy”
in the first of his lectures in The Nature of the Judicial Process blends these
approaches; he uses the terms “logic” and “symmetry,” as well as
“analogy,” as synonyms for consistency and noncontradiction.218 Earlier
approaches had implied an aesthetic approach to logic, appealing to a
sense of symmetry somewhere between that of holistic coherence and
that of regular correspondence. Cardozo’s equation of symmetry and
analogy draws more directly on the conception of symmetry as precise
correspondence.219
The organizational use of the concept of symmetry in connection
with logic takes a number of forms. In one longstanding variant still
used today, symmetry in any one of its senses may be presented as one

216
See, e.g., Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 378 (1960)
(“[T]here is symmetry and logic in the design of § 24.”); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325
U.S. 304, 313 (1945) (“Statutes of limitations always have vexed the philosophical mind for
it is difficult to fit them into a completely logical and symmetrical system of law.”); Bressler
v. Fortune Magazine, 971 F.2d 1226, 1240 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[D]efendants’ argument has
more than merely a logical or symmetrical appeal.”); Black v. Black, 34 Pa. 354 (1859) (“[A]
proper plea, presenting that issue, would have been more consistent with legal symmetry
and logic.”); Hill v. Sanders, 38 S.C.L. 521 (S.C. App. 1851) (rejecting position as “calculated
to deform instead of maintaining the symmetry and beauty of the law as a system of reason
and logic”).
217
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wilkey, J., dissenting)
(“There is a logical symmetry in this principle.”); NLRB v. Annapolis Emer. Hosp. Ass’n,
Inc., 561 F.2d 524, 533 (4th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he Board has no authority, even in the service of
logical symmetry, to deny a place on the ballot to a petitioner . . . .”); Am. Metal Cap Co. v.
Anchor Cap & Closure Corp., 20 F.2d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 1927) (characterizing position as
“important, at least theoretically, for its logical symmetry”); Adams v. Way, 32 Conn. 160
(1864) (“Any other course would mar the logical symmetry of common law pleadings.”).
218
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
219
Cardozo states, for instance: “[T]he judge must . . . extract from the precedents the
underlying principle[,] . . . then determine the path . . . along which [it] is to move and
develop. . . . The social interest served by symmetry or certainty must . . . be balanced
against the social interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of social
welfare.” Id. at 112-13. This quotation hints at Cardozo’s ambivalent attitude toward the
normative value of symmetry when linked with logic. See Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230
N.Y. 239, 242-43 (1921) (“Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development
of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result will be troubled
by a [rule such as that announced]. . . .”); see also infra note 276.
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justification among others for a conclusion.220 Although this approach
usually does not treat symmetry as a stand-alone justification, opinion
writers have on occasion referred to the symmetry of a conclusion as
“compelling” 221 or “requiring”222 that conclusion. Some such references
attribute holistic symmetry to self-evident generalizations embracing
particular conclusions.223 Others attribute precise correspondence to the
inductive extrapolation of conclusions from regular and recurring
scenarios.224
Still another approach refers to the concept of symmetry to generate
objections to be refuted. This approach involves an assertion that while
symmetry, in the sense of either reflection or correspondence, suggests a
certain conclusion, that conclusion is incorrect.225 A final approach uses
the concept of symmetry to generate the starting point or next step in a
process of reasoning or systematic description.226 This approach seems
220
See, e.g., McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 361 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Perhaps most
important . . . adopting appellant’s proposal would introduce a troubling asymmetry into
the law . . . .”); De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Our
disagreement with the finding . . . rests on more than the resulting lack of symmetry in
application of the [statute].”); In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 7 n.11 (1st Cir. 1980)
(“[T]his asymmetry further supports the proposition advanced above . . . .”); GAF Corp. v.
Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719 (2d Cir. 1971) (“There are compelling reasons in addition to
preserving symmetry which mandate that GAF has standing.”).
221
Richmond Black Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Richmond, Va., 548 F.2d 123, 129 (4th
Cir. 1977) (“[S]ymmetry in legal logic compels our holding . . . .”).
222
See Chapron v. Cassaday, 22 Tenn. 661 (1842) (“[T]he symmetry of the law requires
that we . . . hold the doctrine laid down by [precedent].”); Irish v. Clayes, 10 Vt. 81 (1838)
(“By perfect parity of reasoning, by analogy of principle, by every rule of consistency and
symmetry, it must be held that . . . the law . . . restored the other party to his . . . rights.”).
223
See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 36, at 380-82, 398-400
(describing deduction as container-based reasoning); Winter, supra note 36, at 223-58
(addressing analogical reasoning as category extension).
224
Cf. Keith Stenning & Padraic Monaghan, Strategies and Knowledge Representation, in
THE NATURE OF REASONING, supra note 40, at 129 (addressing social function of
enthymemes in establishing consensus).
225
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 231 F.3d 399, 412 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“While the lack of symmetry between the treatment of cases filed in state court and federal
court may appear to be incongruous, it is justified . . . .”); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“We recognize that the . . . rule produces
asymmetrical results . . . . That asymmetry derives, however, from the . . . test [on] which
the question [depends].”); United States v. Milby, 400 F.2d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1968)
(“[A]lthough the argument has the virtue of a certain symmetry . . . Congress chose to write
the statute otherwise.”); Simons v. Bryce, 10 S.C. 354 (1878) (“It may be insisted . . . that as
in the one case a mortgage must still be regarded as an alienation, that it ought also to be so
considered in the other . . . [to] preserv[e] the symmetry of the law. . . . [W]e are unable to
see by what authority a Court can abrogate a statute . . . even for . . . so desirable an end.”).
226
See Bear Brand Hosiery Co. v. Tights, Inc., 605 F.2d 723, 726 (4th Cir. 1979) (“While
symmetry of application and the predictability of attempts to strike fair . . . bargains are
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first to have appeared around the end of the nineteenth century; Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., used something similar to structure his analysis of
doctrine concerning the succession of rights in land in The Common
Law.227 This variation sometimes draws on the holistic conception of
symmetry, in which case the direction of reasoning is governed by the
court’s asserted grasp of the overall structure of the issue.228 Sometimes,
however, this variation draws on the bilateral conception, in which case
the next step in reasoning is generated by considering the contrary of a
proposition that has already been addressed.229
All of these uses recognize a place for symmetry in legal justification,
but the reasons for this role are never stated. Instead, legal writers cite
symmetry as a self-evidently valuable component of an orderly
reasoning process. Of course opinion writers are not obliged to explain
every aspect of the reasons they provide for particular conclusions. And
with a few exceptions, symmetry is rarely the linchpin of a justification.
But it remains remarkable how little analytic attention this clearly
functional concept has received. This neglect becomes more perplexing
in light of the uses discussed next.
2.

Symmetry as a Threat to Reason

The notion of symmetry as a threat to sound decision-making is
closely related to the notion of justified asymmetry, but the approaches
discussed here use stronger language than do most references to justified
asymmetry, and they move further toward categorical rejection of
symmetry as a useful concept. References to symmetry as a threat
oppose the concept to the practical reality with which the law is properly

lights along the way in the search for contractual intent, our purpose is far more
circumscribed here.”); see also Am. Rivers v. FERC, 187 F.3d 1007, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We
thus turn to the merits . . . . We begin with the critical asymmetry in sections 18 and 10(j).”);
Abbs v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[H]e will be no worse off than he would
have been had he never brought the present suit, assuming (for symmetry) that this suit
terminated adversely to him on the merits.”); ICC v. B&T Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1182, 1186
n.6 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[S]ymmetry suggests allowing a court, in the exercise of full equitable
powers under DeMario, the same scope . . . .”); ICC v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 334 F.2d 46, 50
(5th Cir. 1964) (“Symmetry also suggests a congressional purpose to allow review of an
award-order . . . .”).
227
See HOLMES, supra note 123, at 381. “[A]lthough it would be more symmetrical if this
analysis exhausted the subject, there is another class of cases in which the transfer of rights
takes place upon a wholly different plan.”
228
See, e.g., Bear Brand Hosiery Co., 605 F.2d at 726; ICC, 613 F.2d at 1186 n.6; HOLMES,
supra note 123, at 381.
229
See, e.g., Abbs v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 1992); ICC, 334 F.2d at 50.
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concerned, link the concept to other negative norms, and seem to deny
that symmetry may ever be a guide to a correct or justified conclusion.
Such uses extend well back into United States legal history,
predating most references to justified asymmetry. In some cases,
however, the two approaches overlap. In the Federalist No. 37, for
instance, Madison suggested that only “a Constitution [planned] in [a]
closet or in . . . imagination” would possess “artificial structure and
regular symmetry.”230 Even stronger dismissal of the concept was
common in the nineteenth century: advocates and opinion writers
during this period identified symmetry, used as a guide for justification
or a reason in support of a conclusion, as “unsubstantial,”231
“imagined,”232 a “fancied”233 temptation to be resisted,234 the object of an
irrational “blind love,”235 the source of only temporary gratification,236 a
source of distortion,237 “hazardous,”238 and confusing.239 Rejections of
arguments based on “mere” symmetry240 span both nineteenth- and

THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Seymour’s Adm’r v. Beach, 4 Vt. 493 (1831) (“To restore symmetry in the
law . . . would be [a] benefit[ ] too . . . unsubstantial to justify . . . disturbing the settled
law. . . .”).
232
Moore v. Paul, 28 S.C. Eq. 358, 1855 WL 3164 (S.C. App. Eq. Jan. 1855) (per curiam).
233
McCree v. Houston, 7 N.C. 429 (1819) (argument for defendant) (“[M]en should make
laws to meet actual . . . mischiefs, and not to accommodate their acts to the fancied
symmetry of the theorist.”).
234
Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173 (1874) (“[P]rofessional persons are under a constant
temptation to make the law symmetrical by disregarding small things.”).
235
Tompkins v. Hollister, 27 N.W. 651, 656 (Mich. 1886) (citing STORY, supra note 161);
Sparks v. Pittman, 51 Miss. 511 (1875) (same).
236
Golson v. Dunlap, 73 Cal. 157, 16,214 P. 576, 578 (1887). “A fixed standard might
gratify a love of symmetry and be easy of application, but would not further the ends of
justice.” Id.
237
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story noted:
Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and
harmony in language, having found in the constitution a word used in
some sense, which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it,
have made that the standard, by which to measure its use in every
other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on
the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning, when it seemed too
large for their purposes, and extending it, when it seemed too short.
STORY, supra note 161, § 454; see also State v. Shaw, 9 S.C. 94 (1878) (quoting this passage).
238
Painter v. Pasadena Land & Water Co., 91 Cal. 74, 84-85 (1891).
239
Hall v. City of Ionia, 38 Mich. 493 (1878) (“Some confusion has . . . been caused by an
attempt among writers to create symmetry in the law by putting all rights connected with
land . . . into classes . . . .”).
240
See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (“Mere logical symmetry and
abstract reasoning are . . . not enough . . . to support [the proposed] doctrine . . . .”); State v.
McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491 (1860) (“[A]n exceptional rule . . . likely to be characterized as an
230
231
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twentieth-century legal writing. Opinion writers have been emphatically
dismissive: judicial opinions have called symmetry superficial,241 a
matter of nit-picking “niceties,”242 an “academic desire,”243 “a sort of
legal scholasticism,”244 an “unrealistic” goal seriously entertained by “no
one in his right mind,”245 “misleading,”246 “illusory,”247 a “deceptive” 248
and “seductive”249 “lure,”250 attractive only to the naïve,251 a quixotic
goal,252 “purposeless,”253 “sterile,”254 “inappropriate,”255 irrelevant,256 and
spurious.257

absurdity by the mere advocates of logical symmetry in the law, will nevertheless be sure,
in the long run, to constantly gain ground . . . .”).
241
Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249, 1253 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[E]quating the two might produce
a certain superficial symmetry, [but] doing so flies in the teeth of history.”); Claudio v.
Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 811-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The superficial
symmetry of this argument ignores the nature of the appellate function.”); Potomac Elec.
Power Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp., 606 F.2d 1324, 1328 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The
apparent symmetry achieved by this argument is only superficially pleasing . . . .”); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 657 (2d Cir. 1974) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring) (“[S]uch a . . . doctrine . . . may have surface appeal to those dedicated to sheer
symmetry . . . .”).
242
United States v. F.&M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 249 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he problem before us concerns not the niceties of abstract logic or legal
symmetry, but the practicalities of litigation and judicial administration in the federal
courts . . . .”).
243
CIR v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960) (referring to “academic desire
for . . . symmetry”).
244
Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Tamm, J., dissenting)
(disparaging majority opinion as “self-justifying . . . adroit intellectual symmetry—a sort of
legal scholasticism”).
245
United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1964) (Tuttle, J.,
dissenting) (“[N]o one in his right mind is unrealistic enough to suppose that the law is
always a perfect symmetry, never involves contradictions, always avoids conflicts.”).
246
Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178, 190 (8th Cir. 1968).
247
United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he apparent symmetry is
illusory . . . .”).
248
Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 1971).
249
United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1203 (7th Cir. 1990) (Ripple, J., dissenting).
250
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 324 (1955); cf. ScrippsHoward Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 19 (1942) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]o seize on that
lack of symmetry here is to miss the forest for the trees.”).
251
Exacto Spring Corp. v. CIR, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.) (“One would
have to be awfully naive to believe that the seven-factor test generated this pleasing
symmetry.”).
252
Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 188-89 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(denouncing approach that gives “every evidence of pursuing a quest for what it seems to
regard as a desirable or necessary symmetry and, in my view, and most unfortunately,
indulg[ing] in a faulty analysis of the Code’s structure”).
253
Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappij Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274, 1282 (5th Cir. 1978).
254
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 633 F.2d
302, 307 (3d Cir. 1980).
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Justice Stevens’s 2004 dissent in Dretke v. Haley is a good recent
example of this approach and illustrates both its strength and its
pitfalls.258 The majority in Haley refused to articulate a new actualinnocence exception to the rule of procedural default in habeas corpus
doctrine, even though this seemed to result in great injustice to the
petitioner.259 Justice Stevens opened his dissent with the following
criticism of the majority’s conclusion: “The unending search for
symmetry in the law can cause judges to forget about justice. This
should be a simple case.”260 He thus expressly characterized the
majority’s conclusion as stemming from a drive toward symmetry and as
a deliberate departure from the achievement of justice in the case.
Moreover, Justice Stevens implied that the majority must have actively
chosen not to resolve Haley’s petition as justice clearly indicated it
should be resolved: “This should be a simple case.”261 This statement
aligns the majority’s pursuit of holistic doctrinal symmetry with a
conscious choice to act incorrectly or at least benightedly. Of course, in
making this statement, Justice Stevens attributed an active role to that
wing of the Court from which he was distinguishing his own position.
The outcome Justice Stevens advocated is, in contrast, implicitly so
obviously correct as to require virtually no conscious decision-making to
discern. In this way, Justice Stevens’s critique, like the long tradition of
similar critiques cited in this section, ultimately functions just like the
positive appeals to symmetry that it ostensibly rejects.262
Such negative references to symmetry are also problematic in
another way. Previous sections have shown how the perception of
symmetry in the problems faced by courts has been as much a constant
in opinion writers’ understandings of their own roles as denial of the
writers’ agency. The very pervasiveness of the concept suggests that it
serves a useful purpose, but rhetoric like Justice Stevens’s denies that
Pinkney v. Keane, 920 F.2d 1090, 1094 (2d Cir. 1990).
See Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 119 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Notwithstanding the
symmetrical satisfaction of leaving federal law to federal courts and state law to state
courts, we cannot read § 1367 [as urged] . . . .”); United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 714
(5th Cir. 1996) (“Our issue is error, not symmetry.”).
257
EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass’n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2003).
258
541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259
All parties conceded that the petitioner was actually innocent of the convicted crime.
Id. at 397. The majority’s conclusion was that actual innocence should not be recognized as
an exception. Id.
260
Id. at 396.
261
Id.
262
In this, Justice Stevens’s opinion also conforms to the standard rhetoric of judicial
dissents, which often cast the accompanying majority opinion as activist. See Chemerinsky,
supra note 2, at 2010, 2019-21.
255
256
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conclusion. The next section explores some of the purposes the concept
may have served in the past and can serve now.
V. IMPLICATIONS
A topical survey was the clearest way to present the full scope of the
patterns in courts’ references to symmetry and to show how closely these
references are linked to courts’ self-description of their own functions.
But this survey also noted numerous historical shifts in these references.
For further clarification, this Part first chronologically recapitulates
highlights of the survey above. The review draws out both the
consistencies and the developments in legal writers’ reliances on the
concept.
This discussion next identifies two cautionary aspects of the patterns
described.
First, as noted repeatedly above, legal writers have
consistently used the concepts of symmetry and asymmetry to describe
the judicial function as predominantly passive. This consistency is a
symptom of a more widespread conceptual and rhetorical pattern that
identifies courts as basically passive institutions. This pattern is in turn
one aspect of an ongoing vulnerability in the legal system’s selfdescription of its function.
Second, the unreflective reliance on
conceptions of symmetry to structure or drive legal thought and writing
contributes incrementally to entrenchment of this pattern, helping to
make perception of the weakness more difficult. At the same time, a
closer look at the function of the conceptions of symmetry in legal
rhetoric suggests ways of using those conceptions to structure and
articulate legal analysis in more self-consciously constructive ways.
A. Historical Trends in Conceptions of Symmetry
The earliest use of the concept of symmetry in legal rhetoric
discussed above is Blackstone’s use of the edifice metaphor to describe
the English common law in the 1760s.263 Blackstone’s reference to
holistic symmetry distances the edifice and the law from present-day
judicial action. American adoption of this metaphor by advocates, and
especially by judges, served a function similar to American reliance on
Blackstone more generally. By characterizing their undertakings as a
matter of appreciation rather than construction, American judges and
lawyers could also present their activity as part of a coherent national
legal tradition, even where no such thing clearly existed yet.264 During
263
264

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, at 59-60, 467-68.
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this period, lawyers and judges worked in an institutional context
characterized by dispersion and disconnection and in an intellectual
culture stressing synthesis and universalism.265 These factors combined
to make the edifice metaphor and the holistic sense of symmetry—
apparently the primary sense in general use at the time—attractive
conceptual models of the judicial function.266
In the mid-nineteenth century, legal writers also began to use the
concept of symmetry in the sense of precise correspondence. One way of
understanding the increased use of this conception in the legal context is
in relation to the trend toward legal formalism and a new culture-wide
emphasis on expert inquiry in the second half of the century.267 As
experts in other institutions—including legislatures, government
agencies, corporations, universities, and other organizations268—began to
take on the functions of coordinating activity and resolving conflicts,
legal writers increasingly focused on assertions of their own expertise
and institutional autonomy.269 Given its mathematical and scientific
origins and its connotations of regularity and predictability, the sense of
symmetry as correspondence would have been clearly useful in this
regard.270 And as translational symmetries proliferated in the everyday
lives of Americans, this schema would have come more and more
readily to mind.271

265
See, e.g., id., at 226-49; WOOD, supra note 14, at 29, 58-59, 261 (discussing holism and
organicism of eighteenth-century political science and legal theory).
266
Thus, throughout this period, when courts do not refer to the law as an edifice, they
tend to refer to it as a seamless web. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chapman, 54 Mass. 68
(1847) (“[W]ithout the common law, our legislation and jurisprudence would be impotent,
and wholly deficient in completeness and symmetry, as a system of municipal law.”); Lyle
v. Richards, 1823 WL 2183, 9 Serg. & Rawle 322 (Pa. 1823) (noting that rule against
contingent remainders “filled up the vacuum, and preserved the symmetry, by converting
the tenant for life into a trustee to support the remainders”).
267
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, passim; GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
41-67 (1977); HORWITZ, supra note 150, passim.
268
See DOUGLAS, supra note 73, at 47-48, 111-12 (discussing ANDREW SCHOTTER, THE
ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1981)); FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, passim.
269
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, at 340-46, 463-500; THOMAS J. SCHLERETH, VICTORIAN
AMERICA: TRANSFORMATIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE, 1876-1915, at 249-53 (1991).
270
See supra notes 150-53, 216-217 and accompanying text. In addition to using the
concept of symmetry to assert their institutional distinctiveness, courts used the concept to
characterize the functions performed by their new lawmaking competitors, legislatures.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, at 260-72; HORWITZ, supra note 150, at 259. Thus, in the early
nineteenth century, courts begin to attribute to legislatures holistic symmetric purposes.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Later, they begin to describe statutes as logically
consistent and therefore symmetrical. See supra notes 171, 173 and accompanying text.
271
See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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In the late nineteenth century, the emphasis on expertise became
stronger and more compromised.272 A focus on expertise usually will
focus on parts more than on wholes, and this emphasis makes full
acknowledgment of context difficult. The intellectual life of this period
is marked by discomfort with the growing difficulty of fitting highly
specialized human creations—technological, intellectual, institutional—
into a cohesive lived experience. Descriptions of this difficulty and
efforts to overcome it are characteristic of the period both within and
outside the law.273 Continued references to symmetry in the holistic
sense, and to holism generally, were one response. Legal and opinion
writers also responded in other ways: by preferring particularized,
context-dependent, “practical” justice to symmetrical theory and by
asserting that theoretical asymmetry might be unavoidable.274
Into the twentieth century, this discomfort has continued to generate
conceptual pluralism and critical reflection, as well as a sustained
impetus toward denial of the created aspects of the law. Legal and
opinion writers have continued to invoke holistic symmetry and to refer
positively to symmetry in the sense of precise correspondence. But the
early twentieth century also saw the first notable references to bilateral
symmetry in connection with the functions of courts.275 From that
period, legal writers, and especially opinion writers, have drawn on not
two, but three, different conceptions of symmetry in articulating the
function of courts.276

See HORWITZ, supra note 150, passim.
See, e.g., id. at 194-95; Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV.
787 (1989).
274
See supra notes 120-24, 174-75 and accompanying text. In line with the increasing
stress on the concrete, this period also sees a shift toward references to the judicial system
itself, and not simply justice or doctrine, as the edifice of the law. See supra notes 192-94
and accompanying text.
275
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S.
138, 144 (1914). Morton Horwitz has contended that the practice of interest balancing as a
mode of legal analysis also first appeared in the first few decades of the twentieth century,
although he presents this emergence as a reaction to formalism, not in terms of the
emergence of bilateral symmetry as a conceptual model. See HORWITZ, supra note 150, at
18, 131; cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 948-49 (1987) (contending that the practice first emerged in constitutional adjudication
in the 1930s and 1940s).
276
Judge (and then) Justice Cardozo’s varying attitudes toward all three conceptions of
symmetry illustrate the confusion implicit in this proliferation. Robert Laurence notes that
many of Cardozo’s early opinions were critical of the concept. See Laurence, supra note 90,
at 876 n.53. But in The Nature of the Judicial Process, published during his time on the New
York bench, Judge Cardozo equated the legitimate decision-making principle of analogy
with reason and symmetry. See supra note 218. To be sure, he qualified his endorsement of
272
273
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Despite this pluralism, recent legal rhetoric is pervaded above all by
references to bilateral symmetry. This sense of symmetry is both potent
and problematic because of its flexibility and apparent naturalness.
Bilateral symmetry embodies aspects of both of the other conceptions of
symmetry used in legal rhetoric.
Bilateral analysis proposes a
relationship of precise correspondence between the relevant aspects of
its paired components and holistically implies that no analysis is needed
beyond the identification of a relationship of inverted correspondence.
Because the schema embodies both action and its nullification, it is the
perfect metaphor of self-functioning for actors who wish to deny that
they act on the world. 277 It also necessarily limits the amount of
information under analysis.278 For these reasons, the bilateral conception
of symmetry may be an even more problematic rhetorical and
conceptual tool than the other senses of symmetry. Indeed, as the
discussions above indicate, most critiques of the normative use of this
conception nevertheless rely on it. This conception thus easily ends up
driving and constraining analysis, leading it into circularity or indicating
that a problem has been fully considered when its analysis has in fact
only just begun.279
To summarize, legal writers’ use of the concept of symmetry has
moved from an almost exclusive focus on the holistic sense to a reliance
on all three senses of the term. The bilateral sense, perhaps embracing
the other two, seems increasingly to predominate. These developments
have occurred alongside increasing conceptual fragmentation:
a
movement to a state in which the term “symmetry” names several
different ideas and is treated with continued ambivalence. These
changes have occurred against a backdrop of increasing difficulty in
articulating the function of the legal system, a difficulty in itself partly a
product of the proliferation of roles played by the system and the
pressure on actors within the system to deny its activity and the
contingency of their decision-making.

this principle, and in Jacobs & Young v. Kent, decided the same year, he criticized the holistic
sense of symmetry. 230 N.Y. 239, 242-43 (1921), quoted supra note 219. But just three years
later, in The Growth of the Law, he described justice as “consistent with symmetry and
order.” BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 89 (1924). And in Palko v.
Connecticut, he took as his reference point symmetry not only in the holistic sense but also
in the relatively new sense of bilateral reflection. 302 U.S. at 328.
277
See supra notes 24, 62-71 and accompanying text.
278
See supra notes 24, 64-69 and accompanying text.
279
See supra note 24.
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B. Symmetry as a Symptom
1.

The Problem with Judicial Passivity

The discussion above has sought to show that references to
symmetry have consistently functioned as both a way to refer to what
courts do and should be doing, and a way to indicate that they are
actually doing nothing at all. When judicial opinions use the concept of
symmetry metaphorically, they most often use it as a placeholder for
descriptions of judicial function.280 It refers to the work courts do:
resolving conflict and imposing coherence through the perception or
declaration of holistic symmetry; safeguarding regularity and
impartiality through the identification of translational symmetries; and
ensuring the full consideration of competing interests through the
structuring of analysis on the model of bilateral reflection. The
compressed and familiar nature of all three of the symmetry schemas
suits them well for use in summary references to the function of the
judicial system. They are generally used, however, not to explicate this
function, but to demonstrate that it is so simple as to be almost
nonexistent. In this regard, the schemas simply reinforce the dominant
articulation of the function of the law in our culture, which characterizes
that function negatively rather than affirmatively. This section briefly
explores the reasons for this dominant articulation, touched on in the
previous section in the context of references to symmetry, within a
description of its wider scope and problematic implications.
Descriptions of the judicial system as passive are ubiquitous in
analyses of the nature of that system.281 We commonly note, for instance,
that in an adversarial system, litigants define the contours of the
controversies that the system resolves. In such a system, judges and
courts are understood as fundamentally passive.282 The Constitution
ratifies this characterization, for the federal courts, through the
280
Even when courts use the concept to refer to judicial functions less directly—as in
invocations of justified asymmetry or of the legislature’s intention to create a symmetrical
statutory scheme—the perception of symmetry and the judgment regarding its normative
value remain implicitly judicial tasks.
281
The roots of this tradition extend beyond the founding of the United States, see Ellen
E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301 (198889), but its ultimate origins lie outside the scope of the present study.
282
See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY
FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 137 (1986); Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking
the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1789-90
(2004); Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454,
1481 (2000); Sward, supra note 281, at 312-13, 335-36 (1988-89).
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jurisdictional restrictions of Article III.283 Characterizations of courts as
lacking agency are also central to Alexander Hamilton’s characterization
of the judicial system in the Federalist as the branch that “can take no
active resolution whatever.”284
Scholars have also long recognized the conventions through which
judicial rhetoric itself dramatizes judicial action as passive and
constrained, whether by conventions of precedential reasoning,285 the
constitutional assignment of more active roles to the political branches,286
or the need to enact social consensus.287 These conventional judicial
stances are reinforced by a generally high scholarly view of judicial
passivity. Many current commentators describe both the negative
definition of the judicial function288 and the extreme constraint, or even
determination, of judicial action by social, economic, institutional, and
political factors as not only inherent in the system, but also, perhaps, its
defining feature.289 An important example of this tendency appears in
the debate surrounding the notions of judicial activism and specifically
in the evident difficulty of generating a solid response to that charge,
even though many acknowledge the term “judicial activism” to be
unsatisfactory and possibly even meaningless.290

U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Molot, supra note 282, at 1762-63.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Structural
characteristics are not the only constraints on the action of courts. Jonathan T. Molot has
noted the range of financial, social, reputational, and historical factors that constrain
judicial action. See Molot, supra note 282, at 1757-58, 1782-96; see also Dorf, supra note 87, at
69-83.
285
See also Molot, supra note 282, at 1758-59, 1801-03; Peters, supra note 282, at 1499-1513.
See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 168. Much of this commentary, deriving from Bickel’s
work, focuses on the United States Supreme Court. But the tradition of precedentialist
constraint is applicable to other courts as well, including state courts. Cf. Dorf, supra note
87, at 32-33.
286
See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 69, 183-98; Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1751-60,
1762-66 (1976); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1413,
1430-32 (1997); Peters, supra note 282, at 1455-76.
287
Ferguson, supra note 2, at 208; see also BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra,
at 86, 188, 204-07.
288
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 286, at 1736-37, 1742-43, 1751-62.
289
See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 69-71, 111-98, 200;
VERMEULE, supra note 167, at 86-181; Lessig, supra note 286, passim; Sward, supra note 281, at
312-13, 335-36.
290
On problems with the term “judicial activism,” see, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at
2019-20; Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1441, 1442-44 (2004); and Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2002).
283
284
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Although the tendency to follow judicial self-presentation by
describing courts as desirably passive is widespread, it is not
universal.291 Critiques of judicial passivity start from the same point as
celebrations of that passivity: the need to articulate the distinctiveness of
the system in order to legitimate its actions. These critiques note that it is
difficult to legitimate an institution defined in primarily negative
terms.292 Many such critiques focus on the vices of passivity in judicial
rhetoric: its inconsistency with the actual practice of courts in resolving
real problems;293 the tendency it may have to promote a sense that
judges, because their role is passive, are also unconstrained;294 and the
obstacles it creates for clear communication with the political branches
and other institutional actors.295 A few critiques have offered alternative,
affirmative characterizations of the judicial role, but most limit these
characterizations to particular features of the system—arguing that
courts should, for instance, focus only on the protection of individual
rights—instead of reconceptualizing the plural functions that the system
actually serves.296 This is not an entirely satisfactory solution to the
problem.
The difficulty with articulating the distinctiveness of the judicial
system, while doing full justice to its plural functions, directly underpins
the controversies over judicial activism.297 Most often, that term
describes either the assertion of decision-making autonomy by particular
individual judges or the assertion of decision-making authority on behalf
of the judicial system so as to override acts of other branches of
government, which are understood as making the same types of policy
decisions through other mechanisms.298 It is impossible to respond to
291
Alexander Bickel, despite his championing of the passive virtues, also criticized the
rhetoric of passivity, identifying it with “mechanical jurisprudence.” See BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 71, 77-80, 91-93.
292
See, e.g., Molot, supra note 282, at 1838-47; cf. Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the “Relative
Autonomy” of Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1989-92 (1998) (discussing difficulties of
articulating “relative autonomy” of the legal system affirmatively).
293
See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, SUP. CT. REV., 2002, at 343,
378-98, 407.
294
See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 92-93; Molot, supra note
282, at 1835.
295
See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 156, 179; Dorf, supra
note 87, at 13-14, 60-69, 70-83.
296
Commentators such as Ronald Dworkin, Michael Dorf, and Lawrence Lessig, for
example, have argued that courts should be less hesitant about avowing their unique
capacity for protecting individual rights. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
81-130, 184-205 (1978); Dorf, supra note 87, at 69-83; Lessig, supra note 286, at 1414-32.
297
See Young, supra note 290, passim.
298
Cf. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 48, 70-71.
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the confused equation of such different types of activity through
reassertions of the inherent passivity of the judicial role. A more
effective response would discard the assumption that the function of the
legal system must be understood as fundamentally passive and discard
the rhetoric that reinforces this assumption. To date, however, the
function of the concept of symmetry in legal rhetoric and reasoning has
been to strengthen this assumption, not to work against it.
2.

The Mere-Exposure Effect

Every time a judicial opinion or scholarly analysis draws on the
rhetoric of judicial passivity or, perhaps more potently, invokes a schema
of symmetry to organize description or explanation or to justify a
conclusion, the traditions and habits described in the previous section
are reinforced. With each unreflective use of the concept of symmetry,
its power over us increases.
Increased exposure to a symbol will increase our preference for that
symbol, even if we attach no meaning to the symbol. In the 1970s,
Robert Zajonc conducted a series of experiments on what he termed the
“mere-exposure effect.”299 In the experiments, Zajonc showed cards
bearing Japanese ideographs to subjects who did not know Japanese.
The subjects were shown some cards only a few times, others many more
times. Later the subjects were asked to indicate their preference for the
cards, shown one at a time. The subjects showed strong preferences for
the ideographs they had seen many times, even though the characters
held no meaning for the subjects.
To be sure, the concept of symmetry is not devoid of meaning to the
legal writers and commentators who rely on it. But one purpose of this
Article has been to show that when we assume that the significance of
the concept is self-evident, expressing a simple and irreducible truth, we
do divest the concept of much of its meaning and of many of its
implications. This impoverished understanding of the concept explains
both its consistent use in the context of articulations of judicial passivity
and the otherwise peculiar normative oscillations—from honorific to
epithet and back again—evident in its usage for the past century or
more.
The mere-exposure effect suggests that over time this dynamic is
likely to have become increasingly entrenched. It may also have become
299
HUNT, supra note 37, at 505 (discussing Robert Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences
Need No Inferences, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 151-75 (1980)).
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increasingly invisible. The dramatically increased reliance of scholarly
commentary on the concept of symmetry provides some support for
these propositions.300 Adding detail to our understanding of the
concept, however, gives us the tools to remain aware of its implications
as we use it, allowing us to begin to counteract these effects.301 This
Article closes by sketching some preliminary suggestions for future use
of each of the three conceptions of symmetry that have played such a
prominent role in legal rhetoric.
C. A Self-Conscious Rhetoric of Symmetry
The three conceptions of symmetry described in this Article have
tremendous heuristic value, but much of this value is squandered if the
meanings of those conceptions are taken to be simple and self-evident.
The holistic conception of symmetry, which powerfully expresses
our drive toward coherence, has fit so well for so long into descriptions
of the function of the legal system in part because one of the primary
functions of that system has always been the resolution of conflict—
between individuals, between interests, and between tradition and
change. The problem with this conception, and the reason it is the
conception most often criticized in legal discourse, is that it elides
analysis. It presents coherence as an achieved fact and does not
acknowledge the effort and contingency inherent in its attainment.
While this conception of symmetry may in some respects accurately
reflect the way we reach conclusions,302 a conception of the judicial
function that presents coherence as instantaneously achieved in every
case is of little use to other individual and institutional participants in
the legal system.303
When tempted to refer to symmetry in the holistic sense, then, we
should ask ourselves whether we have sufficiently examined and
presented the grounds for our perception of a set of relationships as
See discussion supra Part III, especially supra note 89.
On the effectiveness of debiasing, see Chen & Hanson, supra note 34, at 1228-38.
302
For instance, much of our “backstage” mental operation is more holistic than we
conventionally admit. We tend to believe we know how things work without being able to
articulate our knowledge in detail, relying heavily on holistic “illusions of explanatory
depth” in making our decisions. See WILSON, supra note 36, at 202-06 (describing how
experimental subjects report confidence in their understanding of how particular processes
work but are unable to articulate explanations when prompted). We also eliminate
competing alternatives to our conclusions from consideration in the very process of
reaching those conclusions. See generally Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision
Making, supra note 55.
303
See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
300
301
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harmonious. Holistic symmetry should never be the sole reason
provided in support of a conclusion. Use of this sense of the term as a
pejorative, as in Justice Stevens’s Haley dissent,304 is less pernicious,
insofar as this use tends simply to express the insight that the perception
of a conclusion as coherent, consistent, or balanced is always contingent
on one’s frame of reference, and that such perceived coherence should
therefore rarely be the sole justification for a result.
The conception of symmetry as precise correspondence has been
tenacious within legal discourse for analogous reasons: it seems to
describe both a central aspect of the way we reach conclusions and a
central function of the legal system. When we reason analytically, and
especially when we must persuade others to accept the results of our
reasoning processes, we most often do so using either categorical logic or
analogy.305
Both processes depend on the exploitation of
correspondences perceived as identity in some relevant regard.306 And
we conceive of our legal system as engineered, at least in part, for a
similar purpose: the identical treatment of situations and individuals
identical in relevant respects.307 Using the term “symmetry” in this
sense, moreover, allows us to describe the actions of courts as both
technically exact and minimally intrusive. As uncertainty comes to play
a larger role in our lives and our institutions, the certainty offered by
regularity and expertise may be increasingly attractive. Moreover, as
material models of precise correspondence proliferate in our
environment, we come to see these processes as more and more
inevitable, without ever losing sight of their artifactual character.308
Most of the references to justified asymmetry described in Part IV
stem from the valid insight that, outside of the realm of artifacts and
abstractions, truly precise correspondences of this type do not exist.
Unfortunately, this insight too easily slides into the conclusion—
reminiscent of Westen’s critique of equality309—that the abstractions are
not useful and should be discarded. Actively self-aware use of the sense
of symmetry as precise correspondence would, in contrast, remain
conscious of the utility of the conception as an analytic device and of its
status as a central aspiration of our legal system. This awareness
necessitates a conception of that legal system as a deliberate creation, a
304
305
306
307
308
309
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Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
See VAN FRAASSEN, supra note 26, at 243.
See supra notes 77-80, 300 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
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set of institutions that exist to generate solutions to problems people
cannot solve on their own. This understanding of the system in turn
entails an acknowledgment of its participants as actively engaged in
pursuit of a necessarily aspirational goal.
Unthinking reliance on the bilateral reflective conception of
symmetry may pose the greatest threat to effective reasoning and
analysis. This schema efficiently satisfies both our drive toward closure
and our drive toward variety.310 It thus combines the strongest feature of
the holistic conception of symmetry—its utility as a device for expressing
coherence—and the strongest feature of the sense of symmetry as precise
correspondence—its usefulness in structuring analysis and giving order
to facts. The frequency of this type of configuration in natural forms, in
addition to our apparent predisposition to perceive this form of
symmetry, ensures that reflective symmetry will almost always seem
natural, even comforting, unlike the correspondence conception of
symmetry.
Usage of conception in legal rhetoric confirms this
supposition: it is never the presence of bilateral symmetry, but only
departure from it, that self-evidently requires explanation. As the critics
of the “asymmetric threat” term have pointed out, however, overreliance
on the apparent givenness of this conception can be perilous.311 After all,
our perception of a relationship of bilateral symmetry depends entirely
on our frame of reference; what seems bilaterally symmetrical at one
level of analysis will not seem symmetrical at another.312 Assuming that
a perceived relationship of abstract bilateral symmetry or asymmetry
tells the whole story with respect to a problem under analysis, and that
we have completed analysis once we have identified the complementary
components that, together, form the relationship we perceive, may
therefore lead us to stop the analysis right where it should start.
The bilateral symmetry schema is indeed a good starting point for
analysis because it permits manageable analysis. But because this
schema inherently limits the amount of information under consideration,
analysis should never end with identification of a relationship of
bilateral symmetry or asymmetry. When we are tempted to address a
problem in this way, we should always ask ourselves several additional
questions. What shift in our conceptual frame of reference would cause
the bilateral structure to disappear? What are the reasons not to make
that shift? What simplifications might we be performing unconsciously
310
311
312

See supra notes 62-71, 277 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying note 111.
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in order to make the problem fit this schema? And what difference does
it make to our analysis if the symmetry is conceptualized not in terms of
vertical reflection, implying equivalence, but in terms of reflection
around an axis other than the vertical, perhaps implying hierarchy?
The 2000 opinion of the California Supreme Court in Armendariz313
provides a useful model of this type of analysis. The court in Armendariz
noted, but rejected, the assumption that apparent bilateral asymmetry in
contractual terms demands rectification in every case.314 It further noted
that asymmetry depends on one’s frame of reference: an agreement that
seems asymmetrical to outside parties may not seem that way to the
parties to the agreement.315 The court in Armendariz concluded,
however, that where the asymmetry in question is really a matter of
hierarchy rather than a simple lack of correspondence, as in the case of
adhesion contracts, active decision-making and interference by courts
should not be avoided or denied.316
Unfortunately, the type of analysis conducted in Armendariz may be
the exception rather than the rule; indeed, the opinion presents itself as
such. Much more common are approaches resembling that of Justice
Scalia in his Velazquez dissent.317 In that opinion, Justice Scalia based his
judgment of the constitutionality of a restriction on legal-services
funding largely on his description of the restriction as adversarially
symmetrical, and thus self-evidently acceptable.318 His description of the
parties affected by the funding restriction as complementary but
equivalent litigants permitted this characterization and simplified the
scenario considerably. Analysis in these terms makes no room for the
possibility that from within another frame of reference, such as that of
resource access, the respective positions of the parties involved in
challenges to welfare laws might not be at all comparable. From this
perspective, the dividing line permitting description of the restriction as
bilaterally symmetrical in its effects really marks a hierarchical social
division,319 and active judicial rejection of legal structures that reproduce
that social hierarchy in a way conflicting with the redistributive
purposes of welfare laws—instead of advancing those purposes—seems
far less inappropriate. Summary references to symmetry as equivalent to
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
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Id. at 118.
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Id. at 114-21.
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 551.
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self-evident fairness, such as Justice Scalia’s, preclude more thoroughly
contextualized and precise analysis. Such references not only entrench
harmful conceptualizations of the judicial system as primarily passive,
but also limit the problem-solving flexibility of the system.
Because the concept of symmetry has for so long been used to
describe such disparate functions of the legal system, this type of
unreflective legal reliance on the concept may pose a threat. Not only is
the reliance close to invisible because of its ubiquity, but it subtly
exacerbates the problems inherent in the rhetoric of passivity that
pervades discussion within and about the judicial system. This effect is
unlikely to correct itself as it becomes more and more familiar to us. This
Article attempts to offer some of the information needed for more careful
use of the various conceptions of symmetry. Refusing to take the
significance of these conceptions as self-evident may not only strengthen
legal reasoning and description, but also contribute to clearer recognition
of the legitimate decision-making activities that legal rhetoric performs
and records.
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